Combating Corruption Under International Law by Posadas, Alejandro
POSADAS.DOC 06/22/00 8:20 PM
345
COMBATING CORRUPTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
ALEJANDRO POSADAS*
CONTENTS
I.  Introduction......................................................................................................346
II.  The Fight Against Bribery Goes International (1972-1988)...........................348
A. The Road to the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.......................348
1. Watergate Investigations Give Rise to Investigations of Foreign
Payments: The Bribery Inquisition...............................................................348
2. The U.S. Legislative Response .............................................................352
3. The 1976 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as Amended.........................359
a. Bribery of Foreign Officials .............................................................360
     i.      Who Is Subject to Criminal Liability under the FCPA? ..............360
    ii.     What Kind of Conduct Constitutes a Foreign Corrupt Practice? 360
   iii.     Exceptions and Affirmative Defenses ...........................................361
    iv.     Scope of the Act and Penalties ....................................................362
b. Accounting Provisions......................................................................363
B. The International Consequences of the U.S. Congressional
        Investigations ...........................................................................................364
1. Immediate Consequences .....................................................................364
2. No Significant Progress in the International Agenda...........................369
III.  The World Changes and International Anti-Corruption Initiatives Flourish
(1989-1999)..........................................................................................................370
A. The United Nations’ Contribution............................................................370
1. New Approaches at the United Nations................................................370
a. Addressing Corruption in Relation with the Fight Against
International Organized Crime ................................................................370
b. The United Nations Again Addresses the Foreign Illicit Payments
Issue .........................................................................................................372
Copyright © 2000 by Alejandro Posadas.
* Lecturing Fellow and Doctoral Student, School of Law, Duke University.  LL.M.,
Duke University, 1995; Licenciatura en Derecho, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,
1994.  I wish to thank Professor Michael Byers of Duke Law School, Chris Thomas of Thomas
& Partners, Professor Daniel K. Tarullo of Georgetown Law Center and Richard S. Werksman
for their valuable comments and suggestions.  However, any mistakes are only mine.  I also wish
to acknowledge the support of Duke Law School, Lic. Ernesto Urtusuástegui, and my father
who made it possible for me to research and write this article.  Last but not least, I wish to thank
my wife for her encouragement and helpful suggestions.
POSADAS.DOC 06/22/00  8:20 PM
346 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [10:345
2. The 1996 U.N. Declaration ..................................................................374
B. Developing International Conventional Obligations ................................376
1. The Work at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.................................................................................................376
2. The Work at the Organization of American States ...............................382
3. The OECD and the Inter-American  Conventions: A Comparative
Analysis ........................................................................................................383
a. The Transnational Bribery Offence..................................................384
b. Accounting Provisions......................................................................390
c. International Cooperation and Extradition......................................392
d. Passive Corruption: The Demand Side of the Equation...................393
C. Other International Initiatives...................................................................395
1. The European Union ............................................................................395
a. Combating Fraud Against European Community Financial
       Interests .............................................................................................395
b. Current Steps to Address Corruption ...............................................396
2. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Procurement Guidelines...............................................................................399
3. The World Trade Organization ............................................................403
4. International Non-Governmental Organizations .................................404
IV.  The Development of the Study of Corruption Under International Law.......408
A. Lessons and Questions .............................................................................408
1. Lessons .................................................................................................408
2. Questions..............................................................................................410
a. Questions under International Economic Law .................................410
b. Questions under International Criminal Law ..................................412
c. Questions under Human Rights Law ................................................413
V.  Conclusion......................................................................................................413
I.  INTRODUCTION
The last ten years have witnessed rapid development the effort to
combat corruption under international law.  Recently, two regional
anti-corruption conventions came into force.  The first convention
was negotiated and adopted by the members of the Organization of
American States (OAS),1 while the second was adopted under the
auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD).2  In addition, a number of international organiza-
1. See Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
2. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Done at Paris, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Conven-
tion].  The OECD Convention was signed on November 21, 1997 by the twenty-six member
countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development and by five non-
member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic.
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tions are consistently devoting resources to this subject.  These groups
include several bodies within the United Nations, the European Un-
ion, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), also known as the World Bank Group (WB).  Also involved
are several non-governmental organizations, such as Transparency In-
ternational and the International Chamber of Commerce.
The international response to corruption raises many important
questions: How did corruption become a matter of concern for inter-
national law?  Was it the result of globalization?  Was it the result of
a renewed sense of morality around the world?  Is this part of a global
outcry against the abuse of power?  Are international efforts to com-
bat corruption linked with the development of human rights?  Is trade
competition the primary motivating factor?  When did corruption be-
come part of the international agenda, and why?  And where is it all
going?  While certainly provoked by these questions, this Article does
not pretend to give definite answers.  It seeks only to contribute to
the understanding of the development of anti-corruption measures
under international law by answering the following question: what is
the status, direction, and development of the treatment of corruption
under international law?
To that end, this Article revisits the history of international law’s
anti-corruption efforts in order to generate questions about the cur-
rent status and future direction of the fight against corruption under
international law.  By stepping back and reviewing how international
law has struggled with an issue traditionally considered to fall within
the exclusive domain of national law and politics, this Article argues
that the lessons of these developments are helpful, not only in under-
standing the current status of anti-corruption initiatives, but also in
generating the questions and propositions for the future development
of this field of international law.  This is necessary to contribute to the
emerging efforts to combat corruption worldwide in a more balanced,
creative, and effective way.
Part II of this Article reviews the issue’s origins in the investiga-
tions into illicit transnational corporate payments conducted after-
math of the Watergate scandal.  The survey then continues through
the results of these investigations, including the 1976 adoption of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States and the largely
unsuccessful programs of the United Nations during the late seventies
and eighties.  Part III reviews the emergence and development of in-
ternational anti-corruption initiatives from the nineties to the present.
These developments occurred in large measure as a result of the new
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international realities of the post-Cold World era.  Part III also ad-
dresses the main international instruments and policies to combat
corruption that are being developed by states, international organiza-
tions, and non-governmental organizations.  Part IV elaborates on the
lessons learned from this history lesson, describes the current status
of international anti-corruption initiatives, and raises some questions
regarding the measures to combat bribery and corruption under in-
ternational law.  Finally, Part V presents the conclusion.
II.  THE FIGHT AGAINST BRIBERY GOES INTERNATIONAL
(1972-1988)
A. The Road to the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
1. Watergate Investigations Give Rise to Investigations of
Foreign Payments: The Bribery Inquisition.  In the early 1970s
corruption became an issue of international concern as a direct result
of political events in the United States.  The Watergate investigations
generated a high level of public awareness regarding the questionable
conduct of some of the nation’s political and business elite.
Watergate led to other investigations into the role of major U.S.
corporations in financing domestic political campaigns.  These
investigations, in turn, led to further inquiries into corporate
involvement in foreign political campaigns, with questionable
payments and contributions being made to foreign government
officials.  The hearings conducted by Congress on these issues
revealed facts and events damaging to the stability and reputation of
some foreign governments.  In some cases, this caused other nations
to undertake their own investigations.  Thus, the issue of bribery and
corruption in international business transactions was brought into the
spotlight for the first time and progressively became part of the
international agenda.
The inquiry that would eventually lead to the issue of foreign
corrupt payments was triggered in July 1973, when Watergate Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox publicly called upon any company that had
made questionable or illegal contributions to the 1972 U.S. Presiden-
tial campaign to make voluntary disclosures.3  The information ob-
tained by Cox suggested that multinational companies had not only
3. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. of Foreign Relations, 94th Cong.
5 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 76-S381-6 (Congress. Info. Serv.).
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contributed illegally to U.S. political campaigns but had also actively
channeled resources to foreign governments and foreign political par-
ties.  The Special Prosecutor’s Office shared this information with
American investigating authorities and Congress itself.  The latter
would play a significant role in the subsequent investigations.4
Armed with this information, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or “Commission”) initiated its own investigations,
and in 1975 it moved against four major companies: Gulf Oil Corpo-
ration, Phillips Petroleum Company, Northrop Corporation, and
Ashland Oil, Inc.  The SEC alleged that the establishment of secret
slush funds for unaccountable distribution of moneys abroad violated
U.S. securities law requiring that public companies file accurate fi-
nancial statements.5
In 1975, the SEC also initiated court proceedings against a fifth
company, United Brands Corporation.  Although this case turned out
to be based on similar grounds, it was initiated not as a result of in-
formation provided by the Watergate Special Prosecutor’s Office, but
rather by a singular, dramatic event.  On February 3, 1975, United
Brands Corporation’s then-Chairman, Eli M. Black, threw himself
out of the twenty-second story of a New York skyscraper.  His suicide
led to the SEC investigation, whereupon insiders informed the Com-
mission that the late chairman had agreed to pay $2.5 million to sen-
ior officials of the Honduran government.  This payment was made in
exchange for the repeal of a recently-enacted tax on bananas.6  On
April 9, 1975, the SEC charged United Brands with securities fraud
for failing to report the payment of the first installment of this bribe.
The SEC held that this payment was a materially relevant fact for re-
4. For example, in May 1975, Gulf Oil Corporation’s Chairman testified before the Senate
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations that:
From the time of the initial disclosure in July of 1973, we have become involved in a
variety of investigations.  We have been or are being investigated by the Special Prose-
cutor’s office, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service,
the Eckert, Seamans firm, a special review committee, and by this Senate committee.
In addition, third party lawsuits have been filed and are currently pending.
Id.
5. See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong. 37 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 76-H461-15 (Congress. Info. Serv.).
6. The revelations are also cited as a cause of the later deposition of the Honduras Presi-
dent in a military coup.  See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 656 (1984).
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porting purposes and should have been disclosed to the investing
public. 7
These cases, and the inquiry commenced by Congress, suggested
potential problems among certain corporations, exporters, and inves-
tors.  The SEC initiated a voluntary disclosure program, inviting
American corporations to reveal unreported foreign payments.  With
the cases against these first five companies proceeding, this new pro-
gram implied that the SEC would look favorably upon companies
who voluntarily disclosed questionable foreign payments.8
After several closed hearings on this issue, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations decided to open the proceedings to the public to
ascertain the magnitude of the problem and to determine whether it
required a congressional response.  The first of these public hearings
was held on May 16, 1975.9  The inquiries that followed produced the
most extensive documentation of business-government corruption
ever produced in history.10  The American political system, and in par-
ticular Congress, must be duly credited for its contribution towards
shedding light on a practice that is inherently cloaked in secrecy and
subterfuge.
7. This payment had previously triggered a power struggle within the company and
probably constituted one of the causes leading to the suicide.  See id; see also Facts on File
World News Digest, Apr. 19, 1975, LEXIS NEXIS, News Group File, Beyond Two Years.
8. The SEC program resulted in approximately 500 U.S. companies admitting to having
made questionable payments to foreign officials.  See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 674.
9. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, supra note 3, at 1.
10. See NOONAN, supra note 6, at XVI.  The legislative history of the FCPA is extensive.
Following are some of the most relevant hearings: Multinational Corporations and United States
Foreign Policy, supra note 3; The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad,
supra note 5; Lockheed Bribery, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1975), microformed on CIS No. 75-S241-46 (Congressional Info.
Serv.); Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad, Hearing on S. Res. 265 Before
the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong. (1975), microformed
on CIS No. 76-S361-5 (Congressional Info. Serv.); Foreign and Corporate Bribes, Hearings on S.
3133 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976), mi-
croformed on CIS No. 76-S241-38 (Congressional Info. Serv.); Foreign Payments Disclosure,
Hearings on H.R. 15481 and S. 3664 and H.R. 13870 and H.R. 13953 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong. (1975), microformed on CIS No. 77-H501-36 (Congressional Info. Serv.); Foreign
Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure, Hearing on S. 305 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977), microformed on CIS
No. 77-S241-23 (Congressional Info. Serv.); Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, Hearings
on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. (1977), microformed on CIS No.
77-H501-66 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
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In his opening remarks at the first public hearing, Senator Frank
Church described the concern of the Committee as not being a “ques-
tion of private or public morality,” but rather a “major issue of for-
eign policy for the United States.”11  Illegal political contributions to
foreign governments and transnational bribery were defined during
the hearings as threats to not only the principles of democracy and a
free market economy, but also to the conduct of U.S. foreign rela-
tions, including the lawful pursuit of American business interests
abroad.  The hearings showed that the problem was complex and its
extent serious.  They also revealed that the legal authority then vested
in U.S. administrative agencies to address the problem of foreign
payments was limited and at best, residual.12
The SEC’s investigation and litigation first brought to light the
foreign payment activities of United Brands and Gulf Oil.  The in-
formation gleaned from the voluntary disclosure program provided
further evidence of the problem’s magnitude.  As with other U.S.
agencies, the SEC’s involvement was triggered not by the corrupt
payments themselves, but rather by the failure to provide full and fair
disclosure of information relevant to the sale of publicly traded secu-
rities.13  According to the SEC, the information provided by the Wa-
tergate Special Prosecutor about the establishment of secret “slush
funds” showed that the financial statements filed by these companies
were inaccurate.  Although the central issue for the SEC was that full
and fair disclosure was lacking, the question of whether the funds
were used for the payment of bribes to secure business helped estab-
lish the materiality of the evidence.14
11. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, supra note 3, at 1.
12. For example, the IRS had no authority to investigate questionable foreign payments
unless a deduction was claimed.  And even when a deduction was claimed, investigation into its
legitimacy was hampered by complications in fact-finding and international cooperation.  It is
telling that no foreign questionable payment case was initiated with information provided by the
host government.  Agencies such as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the
Defense Department, and the Civil Aeronautics Board faced similar limitations.  See The Ac-
tivities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 5, at 40-147 (1975).  How-
ever, it should be noted that the SEC was instrumental in disclosing the issue of the problem
itself.
13. To use the words of Commissioner Loomis, the SEC was not charged to act as “guard-
ian of corporate morality,” but to seek disclosure of material information which would be con-
sidered important by investors in arriving at their investment decisions.  The Activities of Ameri-
can Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 5, at 36.
14. In the SEC proceedings, bribery was a primary issue only in the United Brands investi-
gation.  In United Brands, the SEC obtained more specific information on the use of the money
in question.  The Commission found that the company deposited $1.25 million into the Swiss
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In proceeding with these cases, the Commission enjoin the tar-
geted companies from engaging in specified illegal conduct in the fu-
ture.15  Most importantly, the injunctions allowed the SEC to seek an-
cillary relief, such as the reimbursement of unlawful payments by
individual defendants to the corporation and corporate undertakings
such as special investigations, audits, and the preparation of reports.16
The reports generated from the SEC’s action were made public by
the House and Senate committees investigating these matters and il-
lustrated the modus operandi of companies, their agents, and consult-
ants who were attempting to secure favorable treatment for their in-
ternational business transactions.
2. The U.S. Legislative Response.  By the end of 1975, Congress
had reviewed testimony and documents revealing a wide range of
questionable behavior by U.S. companies in their dealings with
foreign governments.  These dubious activities included contributing
four million dollars to a foreign political party;17 leasing a helicopter
bank account of a high official of the Honduran government but failed to reflect this transaction
accurately on their books.  See id. at 37, 70-74.
15. Alternatively, the SEC had the ability to initiate administrative proceedings that could
result in the termination of the company’s rights to issue or trade securities, but this remedy was
considered more damaging to the shareholders, who were innocent victims of the company’s
disclosure violations.  Another dilemma was between actual and potential shareholders.  The
investigations could damage actual shareholders if the prices of shares fell because of negative
publicity, but disclosure protected potential investors.  Another interesting issue faced by the
SEC concerned construing whether bribery and foreign illicit political contributions constituted
material information necessary for an investor to make its investment decisions.  The SEC’s in-
quiry focused on several questions, such as: whether the company relied on the payments to
continue in business; if not, whether investors had the right to choose their investments on
moral grounds, rather than on pure financial ones; and whether the making of these payments
reflected the quality of corporate stewardship.  See id. at 37-38, 60, 61, 62.
16. See id. at 37-38.
17. The Gulf Oil Corporation admitted to contributing to the then-ruling Democratic Re-
publican Party of the Republic of Korea (DRPRK) a total of four million dollars for the 1966
and 1972 Korean national elections.  According to the testimony of the company’s Chairman,
Mr. B. R. Dorsey, the contributions were made in response to solicitations of high party officials
“accompanied by pressure that left little to the imagination.”  Multinational Corporations and
United State Foreign Policy, supra note 3, at 9.  The DRPRK won the second election by a slim
margin, which gave rise to congressional speculation about the impact of the illicit contributions.
Gulf did not receive anything in exchange except, perhaps, the “unfettered right to continue in
business.”  Id. at 10.  Senator Church referred to these revelations as a case study of the poten-
tial impact of transnational business in foreign relations “just as ITT served this subcommittee
as a case study of a corporation attempting to influence U.S. policies toward Chile.”  Id. at 24.
Given the American involvement in the reconstruction and development of post-war South Ko-
rea (which by that time had received nearly $11 billion in foreign aid), U.S. Legislators won-
dered why the American corporation did not merely reject the solicitation.
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for a foreign political candidate and a head of government;18
promoting the interests of foreign governments in matters of delicate
U.S. foreign policy and national security;19 paying $1.25 million in
exchange for the repeal of tax regulations;20 satisfying the bribery
demands of foreign generals;21 incorporating a Swiss company to hire
or contract with key figures in foreign countries to promote sales
abroad;22 and using a governmental line of credit to make
questionable payments overseas.23
18. In 1966, Gulf Oil Corporation paid for the lease and eventual purchase of a helicopter
for the use of then Bolivian presidential candidate General René Barrientos.  These payments
amounted to $110,000 and were funneled through the “Bahamas Exploration Company.”  Two
other payments were made by Gulf to officials of General Barientos’ political party, apparently
at his demand.  These payments totaled approximately $350,000.  See id. at 11.
19. Gulf Oil also made a $50,000 contribution (again through Bahamas Exploration Com-
pany) to fund a public education program in the United States developed by Arab nations to
promote their position in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  See id. at 11, 18.
20. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
21. Northrop Corporation, a California-based military contractor, testified before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations about payments made through one of its agents to officials
in the Saudi government.  In 1971 and 1972, an independent agent of Northrop twice requested
that Northrop management send $450,000 to be delivered to two high-ranking Saudi generals.
According to the company’s accounts, $250,000 had been solicited by one general in 1971.  After
this payment was sent to his agent, a second general solicited $150,000 in 1972.  When the com-
pany resisted, the second general increased his demand to $200,000, which was eventually
transmitted to his agent.  See Multinational Corporations and United State Foreign Policy, supra
note 3, at 112.
22. Northrop was encountering difficulty getting NATO governments to consider its mili-
tary products.  One of its agents suggested establishing an independent company that could hire
or share profits with individuals positioned to help the company sell aircraft in Europe, follow-
ing a model supposedly established by Lockheed Corporation.  Thus, Northrop incorporated
EDC in Switzerland, concealing the names of businessmen and influential people who were not
employed by Northrop but could gain the company access to the European decision-making
circles.  Northrop entered into a contract with EDC through which the latter would receive
1.5% of the sales price of any F-15 aircraft, regardless of EDC’s participation (or lack thereof)
in the transaction.  Most troubling about the arrangement was that EDC was not accountable to
Northrop for whom it engaged, hired, or associated with, nor did it have to report what kind of
services were rendered to the company.  See id. at 151-58.
23. Lockheed Corporation was the nation’s largest defense contractor in the 1960s.  How-
ever, in 1971 Lockheed faltered, and the United States government guaranteed a $250 million
line of credit for the company.  The government established the Emergency Loan Guarantee
Board to provide general oversight of the company, which, for all other purposes, remained un-
der the ownership and control of its shareholders.  The Watergate investigations failed to find
any improper action in the establishment of Lockheed’s credit line.
However, in April 1975, Lockheed was asked to reveal to the SEC any questionable
payments made to foreign officials.  Congressional investigation then focused on whether Lock-
heed had used monies from the line of credit to bribe foreign officials.  When the credit line was
approved back in 1971, Lockheed assured the Senate Banking Committee that it had sufficient
orders to repay the loan and service fee under the guarantee.  No one had suggested how these
orders were secured or obtained.  American legislators were concerned that Lockheed had
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In the early stages of the congressional hearings, some U.S. offi-
cials stated that they would be surprised if the cases then under inves-
tigation by Congress were more than rare, isolated cases.24  By late
1975, however, the evidence to the contrary was overwhelming.
On April 5, 1976, Senator William Proxmire introduced and ini-
tiated hearings on Senate Bill 3133, a measure that would prohibit
payments by American corporations anywhere in the world, grant
prosecutorial powers to the SEC, and require regular disclosure of all
consultants’ fees and commissions paid to foreign agents.  As de-
scribed by Senator Proxmire, the Committee on Foreign Relation’s
concern was that even though foreign corruption had received gen-
eral condemnation, “many companies will continue paying bribes if
they can get away with it, because the potential rewards are so great
and the risks are minimal.”25  He noted that no one had gone to jail,
only three corporations had fired their chief executive officers, and
even Lockheed, which had endured a large amount of negative pub-
licity, was reporting increased profits.26
On May 12, 1976, the SEC submitted its now-famous report on
questionable and illegal corporate payments and practices to the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.  This report
was the result of an analysis of the information obtained by the SEC
through its enforcement27 and voluntary disclosure programs.28
misled and withheld information not only from the investing public, but from Congress as well.
Congress had approved the Loan Guarantee Act on the basis of representations made about the
viability of the L-1011 aircraft sales program.  At the foreign payments hearings in 1975, Lock-
heed’s Chairman argued that its foreign payment practice was not illegal under U.S. law; that
during the 1971 Congressional hearings there had been no discussion about sales practices; that
Lockheed did not even have a particular sales plan at that time; that questionable foreign pay-
ments were commonplace industry practice and were necessary to compete; and that Lock-
heed’s L-1011 sales program had actually produced good returns for the U.S. government.
Nonetheless, he was forced to admit that these payments were illegal in the countries in which
they were made and ultimately represented expenditures of moneys owned by the company and
its shareholders and guaranteed by the U.S. government.  See Lockheed Bribery, supra note 10,
at 1, 2, 6-10, 24-31; see also NOONAN, supra note 6, at 654-58.
24. For example, in response to Representative Solarz’s question as to whether he had an
intuitive guess as to the extent of these activities, the Vice President of the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation responded:
I suspect in the minor kinds of things we are talking about in the sense of paying a bu-
reaucrat to move some papers along, the practice may be not all that uncommon.  I
think in the sense of the very large payments, I would be surprised if there is a great
amount of it.  It is bad business and risky.
The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 5, at 14.
25. Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 10, at 1.
26. See id.
27. The SEC brought a total of fourteen cases starting in early 1974 (when it decided that
the information revealed by the Watergate Special Prosecutor Office’s actions against American
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Through both programs, the SEC was able to analyze information ob-
tained from ninety-five companies.  Sixty-six of these companies were
engaged in manufacturing, and the two largest industry groups within
this category were drug manufacturers and petroleum-related com-
panies.  Fifty-nine companies had been involved in payments to for-
eign officials (the most common questionable transaction), seventeen
had been involved in foreign political payments, twenty-nine had
been involved in sales-type commissions, and twenty-seven were in-
volved in “other foreign matters,” which included some kind of for-
eign payments or other questionable action.29  Corporate revenues
“related to” questionable payments ranged from twenty to 100 times
the amount of the payments.30  The total amount of reported ques-
tionable payments was close to $250 million.31
The SEC’s report came to several conclusions.  The available in-
formation on questionable foreign payments indicated that such prac-
tices were neither isolated nor rare.  While the information was not
necessarily representative of the majority of American business (con-
sidering that over 9000 companies regularly filed with the SEC), the
data did not necessarily represent the universe of violations or ques-
tionable actions.  Many companies may have declined to fully disclose
their activities.  The SEC believed that in the long run, these investi-
companies showed serious reporting problems under the securities laws) until the publication of
the report.  Cases were brought against the American Ship Building Company, Ashland Oil,
Inc., Gulf Oil Corporation, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Phillips Petroleum
Company, Northrop Corporation, Braniff Airways, Inc., General Tire & Rubber Corporation,
Kalvex Inc., Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Missouri Public Service Company, Sanitas Service
Corporation, United Brands Company, and Waste Management, Inc.  Special audit reports
were prepared for the first six cases as part of the ancillary relief sought by the SEC in the re-
spective actions.  See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and
Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices Submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee, reprinted in 353 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 36-41 (1976).
28. The complexities and magnitude of the foreign payments problem, as revealed by the
SEC’s enforcement actions, led the Commission to establish a set of procedures to encourage
U.S. companies to voluntarily investigate any problem and disclose it to the SEC.  These disclo-
sures would not exempt the company from SEC enforcement action but would, pursuant to the
Commission’s stated policy, diminish that possibility.  This program was specifically created to
address the issue of foreign payments, bribery, and slush funds.  Under the program, a company
with problems would be required to take a number of steps, including: conducting an in-depth
investigation of the facts relating to illegal foreign activities, issuing appropriate policy state-
ments concerning such conduct, and filing the results of the investigation on Form 8-K.  See id.
at 3-5.  Eighty-nine corporations came forward under the voluntary disclosure programs.  See id.
at 16-35 (Exhibit A).
29. See id. at 9.
30. See id. at 10.
31. See id. at 16-41.
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gations would help to improve the system, as they would lead to the
strengthening of corporate management and public confidence in
business.  Notwithstanding the serious problems revealed by the re-
port, the Commission concluded that the free market system was gen-
erally sound, and the situation was controllable.32
In its report, the SEC also included suggestions on how Congress
could address the foreign payments problem.  The Commission pro-
posed legislation strengthening the issuer’s requirements to maintain
books and records that reflect accounting transactions and move-
ments, to devise and maintain appropriate systems of control.  The
SEC’s proposed legislation would also make it unlawful to falsify
books or records or to cause someone to do the same.33
Both the House and the Senate comprehensively reviewed the is-
sue of questionable foreign payments.34  The House Committee on In-
ternational Relations and the Senate Committees on Foreign Rela-
tions and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held extensive
hearings on the matter.35
In the summer of 1976, when it became clear that Congress
would take action, President Ford submitted his administration’s leg-
islative proposal.36  The President’s bill contemplated reporting obli-
gations of certain classes for foreign payments made by U.S. corpora-
tions (only significantly large payments), but would not make these
payments unlawful as long as they complied with other existing appli-
cable law.37  This was a conservative approach.38
32. See id. at 12.
33. See id. at 14.  This proposal was introduced as Senate Bill 3418 by Senator Proxmire at
the request of the SEC.  See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1. (1977).
34. The U.S. Congress considered several bills to address improper payments abroad, in-
cluding Senate Bill 3133 (introduced by Senator Proxmire on March 11, 1976) and Senate Bill
3379 (introduced by Senators Church, Clark, and Pearson on May 5, 1976), and the bill intro-
duced on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1.
35. See supra note 10.
36. The proposal was the result of the Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments
Abroad, established by President Ford on March 31, 1976.  See H.R. DOC. NO. 94-572, at 1
(1974).
37. The reports would be filed with the Secretary of Commerce.  Commerce would make
these reports available to the State Department, the IRS, the SEC, the Department of Justice,
and to the appropriate congressional committees.  The reports would be available to the public
one year after their filing, except where the State Department or the Attorney General deter-
mined that they should not be made them public on the grounds of foreign policy or judicial
process.  See id. at 2.
38. For a critical analysis of President Ford’s proposal see W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
FOLDED LIES, 158 (1979).
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After several drafts were exchanged, the Senate opted for the
stricter approach proposed by Senator Proxmire that included crimi-
nalizing both the failure to report foreign payments and the payments
themselves.39  The eventual legislation listed foreign bribery as a
criminal offense because the extensive disclosure of questionable for-
eign practices called for a policy response that could act as a self-
deterring Damocles sword.40
By dealing with the foreign payments issue in the aftermath of
Watergate, Congress strengthened its commitment to transparency as
the best means to address conduct that, if not clearly illegal, was
surely reprehensible.41  Because the foreign payments hearings re-
vealed numerous international illicit practices rather than a small
number of isolated cases,42 Congress ultimately chose to criminalize
foreign bribery on moral grounds.
It is true that the SEC played a significant role in addressing this
issue on its capital market-dimension.43  However, it can be argued
that, in view of the arguments raised against criminalization, this di-
39. S. 3664 94th Cong. (1975).
40. The Senate Report accompanying Senate Bill 305 concluded in this regard that:
The serious abuses, which the [Securities and Exchange] Commission has uncovered,
justify an explicit congressional confirmation of our national commitment of ending
corrupt foreign payments.  While the Commission has made substantial progress in its
enforcement program, the committee believes that legislation is appropriate to make
clear that cessation of these abuses is a matter, not merely of SEC concern, but of na-
tional policy. . . .
The committee considered the matter extensively in the 94th Congress and concluded
that the criminalization approach was preferred over a disclosure approach.  Direct
criminalization entails no reporting burden on corporations and less of an enforcement
burden on the Government.  The criminalization of foreign corporate bribery will to a
significant extent act as a self-enforcing, preventive mechanism.
S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
41. For example, in response to the testimony of Lockheed’s chairman on his company’s
position with regard to the disclosure of the names and nationalities of the officials alleged to
have received payments, Senator William Proxmire remarked: “You and others talk about how
we should stop this.  Everybody in this room agrees it is a vicious and demoralizing practice.
The way to start to stop it is to disclose it.”  Lockheed Bribery, supra note 10, at 32.
42. These practices were illicit at least to the extent that the conduct was prohibited in the
host country or would have been unlawful if conducted in the United States.
43. For the SEC an important issue was the materiality of corporate bribery.  Did not for-
eign bribery mean that certain investment or transaction relied not upon performance, but on
favorable, and possibly temporary, corrupt governmental treatment?  Did not foreign bribery
and slush funds reveal significant corporate issues about the quality of the stewardship of a cor-
poration?  And finally, did an investor have a right to choose her investment on grounds other
than strictly financial information, such as her personal position on business ethics?  These ques-
tions raised concerns regarding the principles upon which the healthy functioning of the capital
market should rest.  See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra
note 5, at 59-61.
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mension could have been addressed by the reporting and accounting
obligations proposed by the Commission.  For example, even though
some had argued that foreign policy concerns weighed against de-
tailed disclosure of information, Congress chose to press for full dis-
closure.44  Similarly, in penalizing foreign bribery payments, Congress
brushed aside foreign policy arguments, pointing to the fact that nu-
merous other countries punish bribery through criminal sanctions.45
Though it had been vigorously argued that the criminal approach
would pose a serious disadvantage to American companies attempt-
ing to compete in the international market, it appears that Congress
ultimately adopted sanctions because it simply considered the prac-
tice to be wrong. 46  In doing so, it laid the foundation for the current
international developments.
Senate Bill 305, as amended by the Conference Report, was
eventually approved with no opposition in the Senate or the House of
Representatives.47  On December 19, 1977, President Jimmy Carter
signed into law the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).48
The FCPA amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
and was the first national statute criminalizing bribery of foreign offi-
cials.  The FCPA also established new accounting obligations as a re-
sult of the SEC’s experience in the investigation of foreign illicit pay-
ments.  Though doubts remain about its success in the areas of
compliance and enforcement, the FCPA has unequivocally entered
the business culture of American companies operating internation-
ally.  The American business community’s strong interest in extend-
44. The State Department stated before the Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy that since the U.S. Congress started revealing the questionable conduct of U.S. compa-
nies abroad, “the head of a friendly government” had been removed from office, “other friendly
leaders” were under political attack, and the property of an American company had been ex-
propriated in one country even though the bribing scandal had occurred in a different one.  Id.
at 22.  For Congress, however, it was not the disclosure that had affected foreign relations, but
the pervasive existence of the practice.
45. The State Department had also expressed concern that legislating the conduct of
American business abroad could be considered an extraterritorial measure and a foreign impo-
sition of U.S. moral standards.  See id. at 24.
46. Interestingly, bribery is one of only two specific words used to exemplify sufficient
cause to impeach high government officials, including the President of the United States.  See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
47. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 95-831 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 38,599, 38,779 (1977).
48. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 & 78dd-2 (1994)).  The Act was amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, and the Interna-
tional Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302.
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ing FCPA disciplines abroad suggests that Congress achieved, at least
to some degree, the Act’s intended deterrent effect.
The FCPA has been amended twice since its passage in 1976.  In
1988, Congress amended the FCPA as part of a broad legislative ef-
fort to strengthen the global competitiveness of American businesses.
These measures were enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988.  The amendments to the FCPA were
included in Title V, Subtitle A of the Omnibus Act.49  The 1988
amendments were aimed at reaffirming Congressional commitment to
stemming transnational corporate corruption, while limiting the expo-
sure of U.S. businesses to violations of the FCPA by clarifying certain
areas of the Act.50  The FCPA was again amended through the Inter-
national Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.51  However,
the 1998 amendment’s intent was to adopt the conventional interna-
tional law obligations negotiated at the seat of the OECD.52
3. The 1976 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as Amended.  The
following description seeks to provide a basic summary of the
organization and content of the Act.53  This will be helpful to
49. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act §§ 5001-03.
50. The final congressional report on the amendments contains three congressional find-
ings and two conclusions:
The findings noted (1) the significant contribution Congress made in enacting the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977, while citing (2) unnecessary concern
among exporters about the scope of the Act and (3) unnecessary and costly paperwork
burdens imposed on issuers of securities by unclear and excessive accounting stan-
dards.  The conclusions states that (1) the principal objectives of the FCPA should be
maintained because they are important to the nation and our trade relationships and
(2) exporters should not be subject to conflicting demands by diverse agencies enforc-
ing the FCPA.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-576, at 916 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1949.
51. Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302.
52. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
53. The FCPA has been the subject of thorough study and review by scholars and practi-
tioners.  See generally, e.g., DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT (1998); JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES (1997); DONALD
R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT : A GUIDE FOR U.S.
FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (1994); Mark Shaffer & Anna
Welch, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 697 (1997); Matt T. Morley & Yan
Liu, De-Greasing the Wheels of Commerce: U.S. Anti-Bribery Initiatives Signal Stiffening FCPA
Enforcement, 11 INSIGHTS 2 (1997); Michael D. Mann & Maria L. Sachs, Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act—Books and Records Requirements: Enforcing Corporate Integrity, 1011 PLI/CORP 303
(1997); Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business, 21
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 749 (1996); Steven C. Perkins, Bibliography on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 14 W. ST. U. L. REV. 491 (1987).
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understand how and to what extent the OECD and OAS
international agreements followed the FCPA model.
The FCPA has two main components: 1) provisions that make
bribing a foreign official a crime (the foreign corrupt practice); and,
2) provisions regarding accounting practices.  These two components
will be addressed in turn.
a. Bribery of Foreign Officials
i. Who Is Subject to Criminal Liability under the FCPA?
Corporations that trade in the U.S. securities market, American
corporations, nationals, citizens, and residents, can be liable under the
FCPA for foreign corrupt practices, as can the officers, directors,
employees, agents, and stockholders acting on behalf of these
parties.54  The FCPA’s liability rests on two alternative jurisdictional
grounds.  Firstly, jurisidiction may lie when there is use of the mails or
other means of interstate commerce corruptly in the United States in
furtherance of a foreign corrupt practice.55  Secondly, jurisdiction lies
when there have been foreign corrupt practices outside the United
States.56  Foreign corporations and foreign natural persons, their
officers, directors, employees, agents, and stockholders acting on their
behalf can also be liable under the FCPA for acts in furtherance of
foreign corrupt practices while within the territory of the United
States.57
ii. What Kind of Conduct Constitutes a Foreign Corrupt
Practice?  A foreign corrupt practice is basically any offer,
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a).  The Act refers to issuers of U.S. securities and do-
mestic concerns.  For the purposes of the Act, issuers of U.S. securities include corporations that
have a class of securities registered, or that are required to file reports under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.  Domestic concern means “any individual who is a citizen, national, or
resident of the United States, and any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock com-
pany, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the
United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”  15 U.S.C. §
78dd-2(h); see also, BIALOS, supra note 53, at 31.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a).
56. See id. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i), as amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998.
57. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3 as amended by the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Com-
petition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302.  Section four of the Act refers to “any
person other than an issuer that is subject to section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or domestic concern” as defined by the 1998 Act.  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competi-
tion Act § 4.
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authorization of payment, or payment of anything of value to certain
foreign recipients covered by the Act.58  The Act covers offers and
payments to foreign officials, including foreign government officials
and officials of international organizations, foreign political parties
and their officials, and foreign political candidates.59  The Act also
covers offers and payments to any other person where the offeror
knows that all or a portion of what is given will directly or indirectly
reach any of the foreign recipients described above.60  For example,
the FCPA covers payments made through agents or family members
of foreign officials.
In addition, the offer or payment must be made for the purpose
of influencing any act or decision of the foreign recipient in his official
capacity, inducing the foreign recipient to act—or refrain from act-
ing—in violation of his lawful duty, securing any improper advantage,
or inducing such foreign recipient to use his influence to affect deci-
sions of governments or instrumentalities.61
iii. Exceptions and Affirmative Defenses.  The 1988
amendments to the FCPA established an exception and two
affirmative defenses that sought to clarify the scope of the Act.  The
exception, commonly known as the “grease payment” exception,
establishes that the FCPA does not apply to payments made to
foreign government officials for routine governmental action.62  The
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).  The Act refers to acts in furtherance of “an of-
fer, payment, promise to pay or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give or authorization of the giving of anything of value.”  Id.
59. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)-(2), 78dd-2(a)(1)-(2).  As amended by the International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, the scope of foreign official was broaden to include
not only “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or in-
strumentality thereof,” but any officer or employee “of a public international organization, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department,
agency, or instrumentality or for or on behalf on any such public international organization.”
Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1), 78dd-2(h)(2).
60. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3).  Under the Act, a person knows “with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, if such person is aware that such person is engaging in such
conduct, that such circumstances exist, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or
such person has a firm belief that such circumstances exists or that such result is substantially to
occur.”  Id.  Knowledge is also established if a person is aware of a high probability of the exis-
tence of such circumstances.  See id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(A), (h)(3)(B).
61. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
62. See id. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b).  These payments are construed in a limited manner to
address such actions that are regularly and commonly performed by government officials and do
not require any discretionary decision.  In other words, these actions will not constitute actions
within the decision-making process of officials in order to award new business or continue busi-
ness with a particular party.  See BIALOS, supra note 53, at 43-44.
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first affirmative defense covers foreign payments that are lawful in
the jurisdiction of the foreign recipient.63  The second affirmative
defense concerns reasonable bona fide expenditures incurred that are
directly related to promotional activities or the execution of a
contract.64
iv. Scope of the Act and Penalties.  As described above, the
scope of the Act is very broad, especially as a result of the
amendments implementing the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.  In
addition, the exception and affirmative defenses are limited in scope.
In fact, they have not yet been tested or invoked in court proceedings.
To summarize, the FCPA applies to any person who has a certain
degree of connection to the United States and engages in foreign cor-
rupt practices.  The Act also applies to any act by U.S. businesses,
foreign corporations trading securities in the United States, American
nationals, citizens, and residents acting in furtherance of a foreign
corrupt practice whether or not they are physically present in the
United States.  In the case of foreign natural and legal persons, the
Act covers their actions if they are in the United States at the time of
the corrupt conduct.  Further, the Act governs not only payments to
foreign officials, candidates, and parties, but any other recipient if
part of the bribe is ultimately attributable to a foreign official, candi-
date, or party.  These payments are not restricted to just monetary
forms and may include anything of value.  The Act establishes stiff
penalties for corrupt practices, including criminal and civil fines and
prison sentences.  Criminal fines can amount to a maximum of
$2,000,000 for corporations and $100,000 for individuals; prison sen-
tences can reach a maximum of five years.  Civil fines and prison sen-
tences can be applied simultaneously.65
63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1).  The purpose of this provision was to re-
move potential jurisdictional conflicts with regard to permissible contributions or payments in
foreign countries—for example, lawful campaign contributions or lobbying expenses.  A valid
defense requires that payments be lawful under the written law of the foreign recipient country.
This requirement does not proscribe application of the common law, but rather ensures that the
absence of a specific statute expressly prohibiting the payment does not of itself signify the va-
lidity of the payment.  See also BIALOS, supra note 53, at 44-45.
64. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2).  For example, it is permissible to send
samples of products to foreign officials in order to make them aware of the quality of the prod-
ucts.  The test of this exception is whether the expenditure has a corrupt purpose.  See BIALOS,
supra note 53, at 46-47.
65. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-2(g)(2), 78ff(c)(1), 78ff(c)(2)(A), (B).
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b. Accounting Provisions.  The accounting provisions of the
FCPA were established to address the concern that companies were
concealing improper foreign payments through either off-the-book
payments or deceptive accounting practices, such as the maintenance
of dual sets of books.  The FCPA’s accounting provisions are
contained in an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act and apply
to issuers of securities that have reporting obligations with the SEC.
The FCPA requires compliance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP), and transforms these requirements, in
the opinion of the SEC, from professional to mandatory standards.66
The Act establishes two basic requirements for issuers.  Firstly, they
must “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which in reason-
able detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of the assets of the issuer.”67  Secondly, they must “devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances”68 that transactions and access to assets re-
spond to management’s authorization, that transactions are recorded
as necessary, and that records and assets are regularly compared and
action is taken with regards to differences.69
Simply put, the first accounting requirement strengthens the
criminalization of foreign corrupt practices by making it a separate of-
fense under the Act if payments are not recorded with sufficient accu-
racy to reflect their true nature.  In other words, if a payment is in-
deed a bribe but is not reflected in the books with sufficient candor to
indicate such, the accounting requirement is violated.70
The second requirement refers to the objectives that the issuers’
general accounting systems must meet for the purposes of the statute.
The standard of care of “reasonable assurances” allows companies to
balance the burden of changing accounting practices with the re-
quirements of the Act.71
The accounting provisions of the FCPA also contemplate crimi-
nal and civil penalties.  Criminal consequences for “knowingly cir-
cumventing or knowingly falsifying documents or internal accounting
controls” could result in maximum sentences of ten years in prison
66. See  BIALOS, supra note 53, at 61.
67. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A).
68. Id. §78m(b)(2)(B).
69. See id.
70. See BIALOS, supra note 53, at 64.
71. See id. at 65.
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and fines of up to $1,000,000 for individuals and $2,500,000 for corpo-
rations.72
B. The International Consequences of the U.S. Congressional
Investigations
1. Immediate Consequences.  The investigations by Congress
and various federal agencies into illicit and questionable foreign
payments had consequences abroad, in countries as diverse as
Honduras, Japan, Costa Rica, Italy, Bolivia, and the Netherlands.
The bribery scandals did not discriminate between developed and
developing countries.  In fact, two of the most publicized scandals
were connected to the senior government officials of wealthy,
developed countries: Japan and the Netherlands.  In both countries,
the investigations resulted in political crises and exposure of the
principal political figures involved.
The Dutch investigations led all the way to the royal family.
Lockheed’s Vice-Chairman admitted at a congressional hearing that
the company had paid $1.1 million to a “high government official of
the Netherlands,”73 who was later implied to be Prince Bernhard, the
husband of Queen Juliana.  In response, the Dutch government set up
a special commission to investigate the scandal.  Under interrogation
about the payment, Prince Bernhard pled “loss of memory.”
After the special investigative panel concluded that Lockheed
“had to assume that the money indeed reached the prince,” the Dutch
government admitted publicly that Bernhard had succumbed to “dis-
honorable [offers] and favors” from Lockheed.74  Bernhard, a hero of
World War II, was spared from criminal prosecution in large measure
due to public sympathy for the revered Queen Juliana, who, at one
point, was asked not to abdicate her throne in order to prevent politi-
cal crisis.75  However, Prince Bernhard was stripped of his position as
inspector general of the Dutch armed forces, and he was obliged to
resign all his military and political posts, including his position on the
World Wildlife Fund.76
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
73. See Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 10, at 58.
74. The panel was not able to trace the money to Prince Bernhard’s pockets.  See William
Drozdiak, Holland’s Prince Slips Back Into the Limelight, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1977, at 16.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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Japan’s Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, also fell victim to the
Lockheed hearings and was forced to resign and submit to prosecu-
tion when it was alleged that Lockheed had made illicit payments to-
taling nearly $25 million to high-ranking Japanese government offi-
cials.77  Tanaka was eventually charged with accepting ¥500 million
from Lockheed, and he was sentenced to four years in prison.78  The
Japanese criminal investigations shook Japan’s ruling party and un-
leashed a fierce internal political crisis.79
These scandals revealed, inter alia, that deep-seated corruption
was not limited to developing nations; business officials of both de-
veloped and developing countries participated in corruption with
similar levels of resourcefulness and imagination.  Interestingly, none
of these investigations led to a call for reform similar to that which
preceded the FCPA.
Although no other developed or developing countries addressed
foreign corruption, the issue was on the agenda of the United Na-
tions.  In 1975, the United States, Iran, and Libya each introduced—
and later withdrew—proposals for a General Assembly resolution on
corruption.80  The General Assembly adopted a resolution on the ba-
sis of a fourth draft introduced by a group of developing and Central
European countries.81
General Assembly Resolution 3514,82 condemning all corrupt
practices, including bribery, was adopted on December 15, 1975.83
The resolution was drafted to reflect the language and objectives of
the New International Economic Order movement and reflected the
77. See William H. Jones & John F. Berry, Lockheed Paid $38 Million in Bribes Abroad,
WASH. POST, May 27, 1977, at E9.
78. See Former Japanese Prime Minister Convicted for Bribery, XINHUA GENERAL
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 12, 1983, available in LEXIS, News Library, All Group File.
79. See Kim Willenson et al., Sordid Maneuvers, NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1976, at 32.
80. The Iranian proposal called for governments to take strict measures against corruption,
asked the Secretary General to conduct a study on ways to fight corruption (including estab-
lishing a code of conduct), and called upon governmental and non-governmental organizations
to assist in these efforts.  The Libyan proposal condemned what it called the immoral activities
of multinational corporations that threatened the safety and security of people and states.
Libya called for sanctions, including international boycotts, against bribing corporations.  The
U.S. proposal called for the General Assembly’s condemnation of both the offering and solicita-
tion of bribes and called for international cooperation to address the problem. See 1975
U.N.Y.B. 486, 487.
81. Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic Yemen,
Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Ro-
mania, Somalia, Syria, Togo, Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.  See id. at 487.
82.  G.A. Res. 3514 , U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm., 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/10467 (1975).
83. See id.
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antagonism between developed and developing nations characteristic
of the 1970s.84  For example, the resolution emphasized states’ rights
to take appropriate legal action within their jurisdictions against
transnational corporations (TNCs).  The resolution also called for the
exchange of relevant information, encouraged home governments to
cooperate with host governments to prevent bribery, and urged states
to prosecute offenders within the scope of their national jurisdic-
tions.85
The resolution also requested the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) to direct the Commission on Transnational Corporations
to include the foreign illicit payments issue in its work program.
During the debates, the United States and Germany insisted that cor-
ruption be addressed both from the offering and the solicitation
sides.86  Notwithstanding the resolution’s emphasis on the supply side,
its confirmatory tone, and virtual lack of substance, it was the first
truly international acknowledgment of corruption in international
business transactions.
In March 1976, the Paris-based International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) announced the creation of a blue ribbon commission to
study the problem of improper payments in international business
transactions.  The commission, headed by British international lawyer
Lord Shawcross, was entrusted to propose guidelines of proper con-
duct for private and public agents in international trade.87  The Com-
mission issued its report “Extortion and Bribery in Business Transac-
tions” in 1977.  The report called for action at three levels: (1) an
international treaty; (2) measures at the domestic national level; and
(3) business self-regulation, including the establishment of an ICC
panel to hear allegations of violations of the code’s rules.88  Unfortu-
nately, the report was mired in controversy (particularly controversial
was the panel proposal), and the ICC’s work stalled for many years.89
84. For example, the resolution cited the Declaration on the Establishment of a New In-
ternational Economic Order, the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.  The last
document was cited for the proposition that transnational corporations should not operate in
ways that violate the laws and regulations of host countries.  G.A. Res. 3514 , U.N. GAOR, 2d
Comm., 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/10467 (1975).
85. Id.
86. See 1975 U.N.Y.B. 487.
87. See Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 10, at 56.
88. Fritz F. Heinman, Combating International Corruption: The Role of the Business Com-
munity, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 147, 150 (Kimberly A. Elliot ed., 1997).
89. Id.
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In 1976, the United Nations continued its work on corruption.
This work was mostly carried out by ECOSOC and the Commission
on Transnational Corporations.90  The Secretary General prepared a
report to cover government measures adopted to combat corruption.91
On August 5, 1976, ECOSOC established the Ad Hoc Intergov-
ernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices (the “Ad Hoc
Group”).92  The group was charged with elaborating a proposal for an
international agreement to prevent and eliminate illicit payments in
international transactions.93  Bribery was not ECOSOC’s priority so
much as the drafting of a code of conduct for transnational corpora-
tions.94
When the Ad Hoc Group submitted its first report and outline to
the United Nations in 1977 it was received with skepticism in some
quarters.  Several countries expressed the view that this issue should
be placed in the transnational corporations code of conduct and that
the bribery working group was duplicating its efforts.95  In 1978, the
Ad Hoc Group completed its work and submitted a report to
ECOSOC that included the draft text of an international agreement
to prevent and eliminate illicit payments in international commercial
transactions.  The report also recommended convening a diplomatic
conference to conclude the proposed agreement.96  ECOSOC re-
solved to establish a Committee on an International Agreement on
Illicit Payments that would continue working on the draft and con-
vene a diplomatic conference in 1980 to negotiate the illicit payments
agreement.97  However, ECOSOC emphatically noted again that its
first priority was the elaboration of the TNC code of conduct, and it
directed the Commission on Transnational Corporations to accelerate
its work.98
90. See 1976 U.N.Y.B. 459.
91. Id. at 460.
92. See 1976 U.N.Y.B. 460-61.
93. E.S.C. Res. 2041 (LXI), U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., 2032 mtg., U.N. Doc. E/5883 (1976).
94. See id. and E.S.C. Res. 2122 (LXIII), U.N. ESCOR, 63d Sess., 2085 mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/6048 (1977).  For example, the 1977 Council’s resolution acknowledged the Economic and
Social Council’s reaffirmation that:
the formulation of a code of conduct by the Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions should be given the highest priority and that the conclusion of an international
agreement on illicit payments should in no way interfere with or delay that priority.
Id.
95. See 1977 U.N.Y.B. 531-32.
96. See 1978 U.N.Y.B. 550.
97. E.S.C. Res. 1978/71, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., 38 mtg., U.N. Doc E/1978/133 (1978).
98. See id.
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Another body created by ECOSOC, the Group of Experts on In-
ternational Standards of Accounting and Reporting, also submitted a
report in 1977 to the Commission on Transnational Corporations and
to the Secretary General.  Regrettably, a strong connection between
this group’s work and the foreign corruption problem was never es-
tablished.99  In 1979, ECOSOC established the Ad Hoc Intergovern-
mental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Ac-
counting and Reporting that was charged with continuing the work of
the Group of Experts and providing recommendations to the Com-
mission on Transnational Corporations on other steps that ought to
be taken in this area.100
In 1979, the United States introduced a draft resolution propos-
ing to convene an international conference that would conclude an in-
ternational agreement on illicit payments.  ECOSOC took no action
on this proposal, which was eventually withdrawn.101  In 1980, India,
on behalf of the Group of 77, introduced a draft resolution that condi-
tioned this conference on the adoption of the TNC code of conduct.
In contrast, the United States’ second draft resolution proposed that
the Council convene an international conference no later than June
30, 1981, to adopt an agreement on illicit payments.102  ECOSOC
transmitted both these proposals to the General Assembly, which
acted on neither.  Nonetheless, the spirit of the Indian proposal gov-
erned ECOSOC’s approach to the issue.
The United Nations’ efforts to develop an illicit payments
agreement was caught in the West-East and North-South struggles of
the 1970s and 1980s.  The illicit payment agreement draft was to some
extent held hostage at ECOSOC by the Group of 77.103  Developing
countries (with the support of the communist bloc) conditioned con-
sideration of the proposal on the completion of the code of conduct
for transnational corporations.  Despite substantial efforts, negotia-
tion, and ECOSOC’s commitment to its completion, the code of con-
duct made little progress during the 1980s and finally died in the early
1990s.  In 1981, the United States made a final, unsuccessful attempt
99. See 1977 U.N.Y.B. 532.
100. See 1979 U.N.Y.B. 628.
101. See id. at 626.
102. See 1980 U.N.Y.B. 668.
103. See Jay M. Vogelson, Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of International Business: Sec-
tion Recommendations and Reports, American Bar Association Section of International Law and
Practice Reports to the House of Delegates, 30 INT’L L. 193, 195 (1996).
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to advance the international illicit payments issue.  The issue did not
return to the United Nations until the 1990s.
2. No Significant Progress in the International Agenda.  As
noted above, efforts to develop an international agreement during the
late 1970s were impaired because the issue was tied to the completion
of the draft code of conduct.  ECOSOC did not even address foreign
illicit payments from 1981 to 1988.  The TNC code of conduct
negotiations continued during this time but did not produce a final
code agreeable to all parties.  The main sources of conflict remained
the nature of the code under international law (mandatory versus
hortatory), standards of treatment and compensation regarding
transnational corporations (whether a minimum international legal
standard existed or national standards sufficed), and questions of
sovereignty over natural resources.  The negotiations were mired in
North-South tensions.
Starting in 1988, however, the changing world economy gradually
affected the United Nations’ work in this area.  For example, in its
1988 report on international arrangements and agreements related to
TNCs, the Secretary-General concluded that recent developments
demonstrated important changes at the multilateral level, such as new
efforts to limit national protectionist and regulatory measures.104  The
Secretary-General also noted “the shift of emphasis in international
negotiations to formulating standards of treatment of TNCs” rather
than their standard of conduct.105  A year later, in its report on the
status of negotiations of the TNC code of conduct, the Secretary-
General noted the trend towards the “transnationalization of eco-
nomic activity, [and] the ongoing round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions aimed at establishing an international regime on foreign direct
investment measures. . . .”106  The Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), perestroika and glasnost in
the Soviet Union, the collapse of the communist bloc in Europe and
central Asia, the widespread economic liberalization and internation-
alization programs pursued by a number of developing countries, and
other events began to change the traditional conceptualization of in-
ternational trade and economic relations.  A new world was around
the corner, and with it new issues—or at least new approaches to old
issues.
104. See 1988 U.N.Y.B. 427, 428.
105. Id. at 428.
106. 1989 U.N.Y.B. 387.
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III.  THE WORLD CHANGES AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION INITIATIVES FLOURISH (1989-1999)
A. The United Nations’ Contribution
1. New Approaches at the United Nations
a. Addressing Corruption in Relation with the Fight Against
International Organized Crime.  The changes in the world economy of
the late 1980s, including the trend towards globalization, also brought
renewed awareness of international criminal activity.  The United
Nations addressed this issue by encouraging international efforts
against global organized crime.  Corruption was reintroduced to the
United Nations agenda as an item under study related to ECOSOC’s
work against organized crime.107
In late 1989, the Department of Technical Co-Operation and
Development and the Government of Netherlands held an
Interregional Seminar on Corruption in Government at the Hague.108
The seminar was organized in anticipation of the Eighth United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders.109  A draft manual on practical measures against corruption
was reviewed at the seminar, as were a number of recommendations,
including strengthening international cooperation to combat corrup-
tion, elaborating an international code of conduct for public officials,
and including corruption in the study of international criminal juris-
diction.110
107. On July 14, 1989, the Economic and Social Council stated in resolution 1989/70 on In-
ternational Co-Operation In Combating Organized Crime its concern that:
organized crime has increased in many parts of the world and has become more trans-
national in character, leading, in particular, to the spread of such negative phenomena
as violence, terrorism, corruption, illegal trade in narcotic drugs and, in general, un-
dermining the development process, impairing the quality of life and threatening hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .
E.S.C. Res. 1989/70, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 50th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1989/70,
E/1989/INF/7 (1989) (emphasis added).
108. See Report of the Secretary-General: Crime prevention and criminal justice, U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social Council, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 5, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/1990/36 (1990).
109. See id.
110. The seminar also noted the connection between corruption and organized crime, par-
ticularly drug trafficking.  It recommended national measures such as economic competition,
deregulation, professionalization, parliamentary democracy, increased public accountability,
freedom of the press, and provision of adequate channels for complaints.  There was also discus-
sion of measures to enhance co-operation by witnesses through protection from retribution and
financial rewards, forfeiture and confiscation of corruptly gained assets, and provisions against
money laundering.  See id.
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In 1990, the Secretary General completed a manual on practical
measures against corruption that had been previously circulated in
the Hague Seminar.111  The manual sought to guide national efforts to
combat corruption by reviewing problems encountered by policy-
makers and practitioners, and it included various suggestions to assist
countries in the development of their own domestic anti-corruption
programs.112
In late 1990, the General Assembly adopted recommendations
on international cooperation for crime prevention and criminal justice
in the context of development, which included a paragraph of rec-
ommendations on corruption.113  The recommendations called for the
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the Centre for So-
cial Development and Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat to
prepare a manual on methods of combating corruption and to provide
technical training to judges and prosecutors handling corruption
cases.114
In 1992, the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and Treatment of Offenders called upon the Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Branch to develop a draft international code of
conduct for public officials.115  In November 1994, the United Nations
International Drug Control Program organized a Ministerial Forum
Against Corruption in Pretoria, South Africa.116  One year later, the
Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders recommended a number of measures for the
prevention of corruption, for example, the establishment of inde-
111. See Manual Prepared by the Secretariat: Practical Measures Against Corruption, Eighth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/8 (1990), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/8/Corr.1 (1990).
112. See id.
113. Paragraph 8 of the recommendation called for nations to take measures against public
corruption.  This recommendation called for nations to review the adequacy of their criminal
laws against corruption, devise other non-criminal mechanisms against corruption, adopt meas-
ures to detect and prosecute corrupt officials, address issues of forfeiture of funds arising out of
corrupt practices, and take measures against enterprises involved in corruption.  See G.A. Res.
45/107, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 100, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/107.
114. See id.
115. See E.S.C. Res. 1992/23, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 41st mtg., Annex I,  U.N. Doc.
E/RES/1992/23, E/1992/INF/7 (1992).  The code of conduct was eventually adopted on Decem-
ber 12, 1996.  See G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 82d Plenary Mtg., Item101, at An-
nex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/59 (1996).
116. See Background Paper Prepared by the Secretariat on International Action Against Cor-
ruption, Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.169/14 (1995).
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pendent bodies to monitor governmental conduct.117  The Ninth Con-
gress also encouraged the international community to continue
strengthening cooperative efforts, and it noted the significant role the
United Nations could play in combating international corruption.  In
Part IV below, it will be further suggested that, in studying the efforts
to combat corruption under international law, the work and role of
the United Nations should be reassessed toward a more balanced and
comprehensive development of the international anti-corruption
agenda.
The United Nations has since developed and encouraged a num-
ber of studies, meetings, and activities related to crime prevention
and corruption matters.  Currently, several units, such as the United
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program and the
United Nations Development Program, regularly address this sub-
ject.118
b. The United Nations Again Addresses the Foreign Illicit
Payments Issue.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for reasons similar
to those that motivated the United Nations to address organized
crime and corruption, the work of the Commission on Transnational
Corporations also began to shift.  New areas of study were gradually
introduced, such as the relation between TNCs and environmental
matters, intellectual property, and trade-related investment
measures.119
With mounting concern about corruption, the Commission in
early 1991 requested a report from the Secretary General on the issue
of corruption in international business transactions.120  The Secretary
General’s report recalled the earlier draft international agreement on
117. See 1995 U.N.Y.B. 1154.  Spain had previously hosted an international meeting of cor-
ruption experts in preparation for the Congress. E.S.C. Res. 1994/19, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess.,
43d mtg., U.N. Doc. E/RES/1994/19, E/1994/INF/6 (1994).
118. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports international and
non-governmental initiatives, including publications, conferences, and symposia, as part of its
program on accountability and transparency known as “PACT.”  PACT has three primary aims:
(1) Facilitating co-ordination and policy dialogue among stakeholders, including pro-
viding a forum for issues and concerns on the international development agenda; (2)
building and strengthening national capacities to develop and implement comprehen-
sive anti-corruption reform strategies, and (3) creating and strengthening partnerships
at the global, regional and national levels for strategic intervention.
Pauline Tamesis, Different Perspectives of International Development Organisations in the Fight
Against Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 129, 131 (1998).
119. See e.g., 1990 U.N.Y.B. 497.
120. See 1991 U.N.Y.B. 465.
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this issue and noted that the draft had attained a substantial degree of
support.  It also expressed the view that national laws alone were not
always effective in dealing with corruption and that international ac-
tion was still necessary.121
By this time, the issue that had blocked the illicit payments
agreement proposal—the negotiation of a TNC code of conduct—had
lost its force and finally came to an end in 1992.  After a July meeting,
the Secretary General reported that the delegations had failed to
reach a consensus on a TNC code of conduct and had expressed the
view that a different international instrument on foreign investment
was necessary, given the changing international economic environ-
ment.122  Thus, the way was paved for the United Nations to again ad-
dress the issue of bribery in international business transactions.
In 1994, two significant, related events had a positive impact on
the work conducted by the United Nations.  First, the OECD recom-
mended that its member countries criminalize foreign bribery, and
second, the governments attending the Summit of the Americas
committed themselves to a renewed fight against corruption and
bribery.  Influenced by these events, the East and Central African
Seminar on Corruption, Human Rights and Democracy held late that
year in Uganda called upon all African leaders to adhere to the recent
OECD recommendation and to follow the example set by the Ameri-
can nations.123
The progress made at the OECD and the OAS led the United
States, along with Argentina and Venezuela, to submit a draft resolu-
tion in June 1996 for a United Nations Declaration on Corruption
and Bribery in Transnational Commercial Activities.124  After several
drafts and attempts at negotiation, the declaration was adopted in late
1996.
Though not binding, this declaration represents the most exten-
sive expression of the international community’s commitment to fight
corruption and bribery in international business transactions to date.
Finally, it is significant to note that the General Assembly has also
121. See id.  The report was submitted in July 1991.  See id.
122. See 1992 U.N.Y.B. 644, 645.
123. See id.
124. See Argentina, United States of America and Venezuela: Draft Resolution: Corruption in
Transnational Commercial Activities, E.S.C., 1st Sess., Agenda Item 6(i), U.N. Doc. E/1996/L.26
(1996).  The proposal was also based on General Assembly resolution 50/106, which recom-
mended that the ECOSOC reconsider the draft international agreement on illicit payments that
had been abandoned years previously.  See G.A. Res. 50/106, U.N. GAOR 50th Sess., Agenda
Item 95(h), U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/106 (1996).
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adopted other resolutions related to corruption and bribery, including
the recently implemented International Code of Conduct for Public
Officials,125 which offer valuable resources in the analysis of interna-
tional law.
2. The 1996 U.N. Declaration.  The U.N. Declaration Against
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions
(“1996 U.N. Declaration”) was adopted without vote by the General
Assembly on December 16, 1996. 126  Though not legally binding, the
resolution expresses the interest and concern of the international
community in the development of anti-corruption measures.  More
balanced than its 1975 predecessor, it encourages countries to
continue anti-corruption efforts in multiple fora, and to criminalize
and prosecute corruption and bribery in international commercial
transactions.127
The third paragraph of the preamble sets the tone of the docu-
ment.  Its approach to corruption and bribery comprehensively states
that the global fight against these practices is essential to “an im-
proved international business environment,” fosters greater competi-
tion, and “form[s] a critical part of promoting transparent and ac-
countable governance, economic and social development and
environmental protection in all countries.”128
The 1996 U.N. Declaration presents a model definition of the ba-
sic elements of bribery in both its “passive” and “active” characteriza-
tions,129 following to some extent the OECD/FCPA model.  In addi-
125. See G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., 82d mtg., Agenda Item 101, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/59 (1996).  The Code was devised as an additional resource for member countries in
their efforts to combat corruption.  The Code defines public office as a position of trust “imply-
ing a duty to act in the public interest” and provides general principles and guidelines for the
treatment of conflicts of interests, disclosure of assets, acceptance of gifts or favors, confidential
information and political activities of public officials.
126. See G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/191 (1996).  To urge the member states to implement the Declaration, the General
Assembly adopted in December 1997 the Resolution on International Cooperation Against
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.  See G.A. Res. 52/87, U.N.
GAOR 52d Sess., 70th mtg., Agenda Item 103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/87 (1997).  This call was
reiterated in December 1998.  See G.A. Res. 53/176, U.N. GAOR 53d Sess., 91st mtg., Agenda
Item 92, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/176 (1998).
127. See G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/191 (1996).
128. Id.
129. Paragraph 3 of the 1996 U.N. Declaration states that bribery may include “the offer,
promise or giving of any payment, gift or other advantage, directly or indirectly, by any private
or public corporation, including a transnational corporation, or individual from a State to any
public official or elected representative of another country.”  Id.  It also operates in the reverse,
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tion, it encourages states to bar tax deductions on bribery payments;
develop accounting standards and practices that can help avoid and
combat corruption and bribery; develop business codes and best prac-
tices against corruption; examine the possibility of legislating “illicit
enrichment by government officials without demonstrable cause” as a
criminal offense; provide mutual legal assistance and cooperation;
and ensure that bank secrecy does not hinder corruption investiga-
tions and proceedings.130
The number of items addressed by the Declaration is ambitious
and reflects concerns developed in different international fora.  The
illicit enrichment concept, for example, was originally enshrined by
the Latin American countries in the OAS Convention.  It is now side
by side with commitments to improve accounting standards and prac-
tices, business codes, and bank secrecy, concepts derived from the
FCPA/OECD developments, private organization efforts, and U.N.
anti-money laundering programs, respectively.
The 1996 U.N. Declaration concludes with a call for states com-
bating corruption to respect national sovereignty, territorial jurisdic-
tion, international law (including the principles regarding the extra-
territorial application of a state’s laws), human rights and freedoms.131
When read in conjunction with the preamble, these closing para-
graphs reflect the balanced approach of current efforts to improve the
international business environment in accordance with the tenets of
democracy, transparency, human rights, sovereignty, and the rule of
international law.
The United Nations is not currently a forum for the negotiation
of obligations under international conventions, but it is an important
setting to bring together different perspectives, mediate concerns, and
promote future development.  While it has failed to make significant
progress regarding the foreign illicit payment proposal in the past two
decades, considering the particular circumstances involved, its efforts
at least “helped call attention to and raise international awareness of
the adverse consequences of bribery in international commercial
transactions.”132  The United Nations will continue to contribute gen-
erously to the development of law in this area, and it should play an
with the official soliciting, demanding, accepting, or receiving consideration “as undue consid-
eration for performing or refraining from the performance of that official’s or representative’s
duties in connection with an international commercial transaction.”  Id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
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important role in any serious effort to bring a universal dimension to
anti-corruption commitments.  The role of the United Nations, in-
cluding its potential contribution to customary international law,
merits further study.
B. Developing International Conventional Obligations
1. The Work at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development.  The U.S. government’s determination to use the
FCPA to extend liability to competitor companies in foreign
countries positively influenced current international anti-corruption
efforts.  The American business community had argued that it had
lost contracts to its European competitors due to the disparate
standards in anti-corruption obligations.133  In some European
countries, such as Germany and France, companies were able not
only to extend “courtesies” to foreign government officials without
fear of criminal or civil liability, but could actually deduct such
payments as tax deductible expenses.
As noted earlier, these concerns in part led Congress to enact the
1988 Amendments to the FCPA and advise the President of the need
to negotiate an agreement with American trading partners at the
OECD.134  However, the United States did not adopt an aggressive
policy in this regard until President Clinton took office.
The State Department, which had traditionally expressed doubts
about the success of FCPA-like international initiatives, made this
objective a top policy priority.  Then-Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher, and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, Daniel K. Tarullo understood that, under the new inter-
national circumstances, the corruption issue raised not only trade
concerns, but economic development and democratic accountability
concerns that could be better addressed and advanced by the United
States under the leadership of the State Department.  In the words of
Mr. Tarullo “it was an instance of confluence among international
aims rather than the frequent case of conflicts among foreign policy
aims” that led the State Department to successfully advocate for re-
133. The U.S. Commerce Department estimated losses of $100 billion from differences in
anti-corruption standards in the three years prior to 1996.  See US Anti-Corruption Drive Pays,
J. COMMERCE, June 20, 1996, available at LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
134. See 15 USC. §§78dd-1; see also Henry Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT’L
L. 509, 527 (1997).
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newed international cooperation in the fight against corruption.  As
explained by Mr. Tarullo, the confluence of international aims and
favorable circumstances included: a) the growing views of economists
about the deleterious effects of corruption on economic development;
b) the growing sense in some developing countries that efforts by de-
veloped countries to police their own companies would be well re-
ceived; c) the change in the views of mainstream U.S. businnesses that
had come to believe that no-bribery policies would be sounder for
their businesses as a whole; d) the growing laudable intolerance for
bribery among members of the public, and in particular in Europe;
and e) the recent establishment of Transparency International.135
The same confluence of circumstances led the State Department
to the conviction that an extended campaign for OECD action could
be successful.  The first effort centered on convincing other OECD
nations to take “concrete and effective steps” to counteract corrupt
foreign practices in ways consistent with their own legal traditions and
practices.  It was not until the State Department realized that this ap-
proach would be used by certain countries to take no action, that the
administration sought a more harmonized approach that resulted in
the adoption, as a working model, of the U.S. response against for-
eign bribery.  Eventually, taking initiatives to export FCPA-like obli-
gations became a central part of U.S. foreign policy.136  Interviews
conducted by Glynn, Kobrin, and Naim with State Department offi-
cials reveal that the negotiations between the United States and its
trading partners at the OECD were not easy: the Americans had to
resort to the media to place additional pressure on its European part-
ners.137  They also note that the escalation of bribery scandals in the
135.  These favorable circumstances, in addition to efforts to reorient the State Department
to a broader set of concerns than traditional foreign policy issues by the Clinton administration
led the way for the State Department to take a prominent role in advancing an anti-corruption
agenda internationally.  At times, according to Professor Tarullo, the State Department had dif-
ficulty maintaining its broader set of aims because USTR and the Department of Commerce
tended to focus exclusively on the trade and commercial aspects of bribery.  Comments by Pro-
fessor Daniel K. Tarullo to a previous draft of this article. See also Patrick Glynn, et al., The
Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 88, at 7,
20.
136. See Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE,
June 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (statement by Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under-Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs).
137. The bribery scandals, coupled with media activism, created and sustained an “embar-
rassment factor” as the European governments did not want to appear on record against anti-
corruption initiatives.  Accordingly, the 1906 English law shifted the British approach toward
the U.S. model and undermined others’ concerns that the FCPA was a uniquely American crea-
tion.  See Glynn et al., supra note 135, at 7, 21.
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early 1990s and Britain’s 1995 revival of its 1906 Prevention on Cor-
ruption Act further developed the case for anti-corruption measures
at the OECD.138
On May 27, 1994, the first material step was taken with the adop-
tion of the OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International
Business Transactions (“1994 OECD Recommendation”). 139  The
1994 OECD Recommendation called upon member countries to take
effective measures to deter and combat bribery of foreign public offi-
cials in international business transactions.140  It also instructed the
OECD’s Committee on International Investment and Multilateral
Enterprises (CIME) to follow-up and review the 1994 OECD Rec-
ommendation and report back to the Council within three years.141
One of the issues addressed by the 1994 OECD Recommenda-
tion was the tax deductibility of foreign payments.142  The CIME
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions
and the Committee on Fiscal Affairs embarked on the review of the
contentious matter.  Though the United States had raised the issue of
tax deductibility, many OECD countries were reluctant to address the
matter.143  Germany, in particular, had resisted in large measure due
to its philosophy that tax matters and morality should be kept strictly
separate.144
138. See id.  The authors highlighted the investigations of French and German politicians,
other scandals in Asia and international media coverage.  For example, the number of articles in
The Economist and The Financial Times mentioning the word “corruption” rose from an aver-
age of 502 per year from 1988 to 1992 to more than 1000 per year from 1993 to 1995.  In addi-
tion, in 1995 Britain resurrected the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906, which regulates
bribery in ways similar to the FCPA.  The unearthing of the 1906 Act undermined European
arguments that the FCPA was a uniquely American extraterritorial mechanism.  The British
also shifted their position to side with the United States at the OECD negotiations.  See id.
139. OECD Council Recommendation C(94) 75/Final on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, May 27, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1389 (1994) [hereinafter OECD Council Recommendation
on Bribery]; see also Report by the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises (CIME) to the OECD Council at Ministerial level in May 1997 (available at
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/briminrp.htm>) [hereinafter OECD Report on Interna-
tional Investment]; Stuart H. Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 31 INT’L LAW. 695 (1997).
140. See OECD Council Recommendation on Bribery, supra note 139.
141. See id; see also OECD Report on International Investment, supra note 139.
142. See id.
143. According to the State Department, as of July 1988, the following countries continued
to allow deductions of bribes paid to foreign officials: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland.  See Hearings on Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, S.
EXEC. REP 105-19, at 12 (1998).
144. For example, Germany would tax prostitution notwithstanding the fact that the activity
is prohibited.  See Glynn et al., supra note 135, at 22-23.
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The catalyst for change was provided by tax experts of the Com-
mittee of Fiscal Affairs, who concluded that that deductibility of
questionable foreign payments was of negative economic utility.145
Finally, in 1996, the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation on
the Tax Deductibility of Bribes of Foreign Officials, which called
upon members countries to modify their tax codes to deny the de-
ductibility of payments made to foreign officials for the purposes of
securing or retaining business.  Since then, all OECD countries have
implemented or taken steps to implement the recommendation.146
The Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions
continued its work on the criminalization of foreign payments.  At the
May 1997 ministerial level meeting of the OECD, the CIME submit-
ted a Revised Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions (“1997 Revised Recommendation”).  The 1997 Revised
Recommendation was adopted on May 23, 1997,147 and it included the
OECD’s resolution to pursue treaty negotiations148 and an annex of
agreed common elements that paved the way to the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions.149
Treaty negotiation is an unorthodox role for the OECD, which
traditionally works upon recommendations that can be implemented
flexibly according to the intricacies of its members’ legal and political
145. See id. at 21.
146. The following countries did not permit tax deductions for bribes prior to the 1996 Rec-
ommendation: Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The following
countries have repealed tax deductibility since the 1996 Recommendations: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal.  As of July 30, 1999,
the following countries had drafted legislation or taken a comparable step to bar the deductibil-
ity of questionable foreign payments: Australia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland.  See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Tax Treatment of
Bribes in OECD Member Countries <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/taxstatus.htm>
(visited May 1, 2000).
147. OECD Council, Recommendation of the Council adopted on 23 May 1997, 36 I.L.M.
1016 (1997).
148. The 1997 Recommendation states that the Organisation:
RECOMMENDS that Member countries should criminalise the bribery of foreign
public officials in an effective and co-ordinated manner by submitting proposals to
their legislative bodies by 1 April 1998, in conformity with the agreed common ele-
ments set forth in the Annex, and seeking their enactment by the end of 1998.
DECIDES, to this end, to open negotiations promptly on an international convention
to criminalise bribery in conformity with the agreed common elements, the treaty to be
open for signature by the end of 1997, with a view to its entry into force twelve months
thereafter”
Id.
149. See id.
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systems.  Actual and effective implementation of the recommenda-
tions is secured through periodic monitoring, reviews, detail report-
ing, and, ultimately, peer pressure.  For example, as late as April 1997
one commentator noted that while only Germany and France advo-
cated the treaty approach, most other members supported direct im-
plementation by national legislature.150  The treaty approach was fa-
vored because it creates binding obligations under international law,
leaves open the possibility of building a broader regime through ac-
cession, and still reaches a balanced result.  For example, the obliga-
tion to criminalize foreign bribery is sufficiently flexible so that par-
ties can implement it in accordance with their unique legal traditions,
as will be pointed out in the following section.
On November 21, 1997, only six months after the Council
adopted the 1997 Revised Recommendation, OECD member coun-
tries and five non-member states adopted the Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (“OECD Convention”).151  The convention entered into
force on February 15, 1999 and is open to signature by any country.152
As noted earlier, the United States has approved and ratified the
OECD Convention and implemented its provisions into law.153  Al-
though the Convention was generally modeled after the FCPA, the
150. Nancy Zucker Boswell, Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes on
Doing Business, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC 99, 105 (1997).
151. See OECD Convention, supra note 2.  The Convention was adopted at Paris on No-
vember 21, 1997, and it was signed by the United States in Paris on December 17, 1997.  See
Hearings on Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, supra note 143, at 1.
152. Article 15 of the OECD Convention provides that the Convention will enter into force
sixty days after five of the ten largest exporting countries deposit their instruments of accep-
tance, approval, or ratification; these five countries must additionally account for at least 60% of
the total exports of the top ten countries.  The ten largest exporting countries are the United
States, Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Korea, the Netherlands,
and Belgium-Luxembourg.  However, the United States, Germany, and Japan alone amount to
41.8% of the total OECD export shares and to 51.8% of the total export shares of the ten larg-
est countries.  See id.
153. The Clinton administration urged Congress to strengthen the country’s leadership by
rapidly ratifying the Convention.  See, e.g., Hearings on Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Treaty Doc 105-43) before the
Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 30 (1998) (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat).
The Senate approved the Convention on July 31, 1998, and the instrument of ratification was
deposited in the OECD on December 8, 1998.  The implementing legislation was signed by
President Clinton on November 10, 1998 and the ratification instrument on November 20, 1998.
See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Steps Taken and Planned Fu-
ture Actions by Each Participating Country to Ratify and Implement the Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm> (visited May 1, 2000).
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United States had to amend the FCPA to reflect some of the new
commitments reached at the OECD.154
Interestingly, during the consideration of the OECD Conven-
tion, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations expressed concern
that implementation delays and lack of enforcement by other signato-
ries could postpone the Convention’s entry into force or render it fu-
tile.155  Congress thus made the Commerce Department responsible
for monitoring and reporting the implementation and enforcement of
the OECD Convention. 156
The Foreign Relations Committee also noted two important
shortcomings of the OECD Convention.  First, unlike the FCPA, the
Convention does not address illegal contributions and payments to
foreign political parties and candidates.157  Second, the Convention is
not clear as to whether it applies to the bribery of family members of
foreign public officials.158  Through these significant loopholes, signa-
tory countries can escape the limitations of the Convention.
154. The implementing legislation, the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302, amended the FCPA in four pertinent respects.  (1)
The FCPA is no longer limited to issuers and domestic concerns, as defined by the Act, but will
reach any person in the territory of the United States who violates the Act.  In other words, all
foreign natural and legal persons are now subject to the Act.  (2) An alternative jurisdictional
ground was included so that the FCPA can be triggered by the territoriality jurisdictional prin-
ciple.  (3) The definition of foreign bribery was expanded to include the purpose of “securing
any improper advantage.”  Id.  (4) The definition of foreign official was modified to include offi-
cials of public international organizations.  Id. at 3303.
155. See Hearings on Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions supra note 143, at 8.
156. The Secretary of Commerce is entrusted with reporting on both the implementation
status of the Convention and the measures taken by member countries to enforce it.  The Secre-
tary also reports on the progress made by international organizations covered by the Act to
combat bribery.  Congress has noted the importance of transparency via the private sector’s par-
ticipation in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.  In this regard, the Secretary of
Commerce is also charged with describing “the steps taken to ensure full involvement of United
States private sector participants and representatives of non-governmental organization in the
monitoring and implementation of the Convention.”  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Com-
petition Act of 1988 § 6.
157. The Administration explained that some countries could not define political parties and
candidates as public officials under their laws, and these countries could therefore not agree to a
convention encompassing these categories of recipients.  The OECD Council agreed to work on
this and other pending issues, such as the role of foreign subsidiaries and offshore money cen-
ters.  See Hearings on Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions supra note 143, at 10.
158. According to the State Department, the Convention would cover family members of a
foreign official to the extent that the payment is effectively passed to the foreign public official.
See id. at 11.
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The OECD has continued to play an active role in this area, fol-
lowing up the implementation and enforcement of the Convention
and the non-deductibility of questionable foreign payments.  In
keeping up with similar developments at the United Nations and
other organizations, it has also addressed the issue of the proper con-
duct of public officials.  On April 23, 1998, the OECD adopted the
Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Serv-
ice.159
2. The Work at the Organization of American States.  Another
relevant international development starting in 1994 was the decision
of the Organization of American States (OAS) to address corruption
and bribery.  The Miami Summit is well known as the starting point
for negotiations leading to the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA), and for the commitment to democracy, trade, and
sustainable development made by attending countries.  The nations of
the Western hemisphere collectively acknowledged the challenge
posed by corruption and committed themselves to combating a
problem frequently described as an endemic predicament of Latin
America.
The Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action signed at the
Miami Summit on December 11, 1994 clearly signaled that the issue
of corruption extended further than bribery of foreign officials; OAS
countries considered linked corruption with the region’s broader eco-
nomic and political aspirations: development and democracy.160  The
Plan of Action included specific commitments whereby the signato-
ries agreed on a hemispheric approach to acts of corruption through a
159. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Improving Ethical
Conduct in the Public Service: Recommendation of the OECD Council,
<http://www.oecd.org/puma/gvrnance/ethics/pubs/rec98/rec98.htm> (visited May 1, 2000).  The
recommendation states that “although governments have different cultural, political and ad-
ministrative environments,” they face similar public ethical challenges and should take action to
promote management systems and institutions to promote high ethical standards in public con-
duct.  Id.  The Recommendation includes a set of principles for managing ethics in the public
service.
160. The Declaration of Principles and Actions was signed by Antigua and Barbuda, Argen-
tina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, The United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  It recognized that “effective democracy requires a compre-
hensive attack on corruption as a factor of social disintegration and distortion of the economic
system that undermines the legitimacy of political institutions.”  Summit of the Americas: Dec-
laration of Principles and Plan of Actions, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995).
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new agreement or new arrangement under existing international co-
operation. 161
As a result of this initiative, OAS members drafted, negotiated
and adopted an international agreement within eighteen months.162
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption163 (“Inter-
American Convention”) was adopted and opened for signature at the
Specialized Conference at Caracas, Venezuela on March 29, 1996, be-
coming then the first international treaty of its kind.164  The Conven-
tion entered into force on March 6, 1997.165
3. The OECD and the Inter-American  Conventions: A
Comparative Analysis.  This section undertakes a comparative
analysis of the main provisions of the OECD and the Inter-American
Convention and will highlight how each was tailored after the FCPA
model.
The influence of the FCPA is undeniable.166  The two main com-
ponents of the FCPA are found in both the Inter-American and the
161. Under the heading “Preserving and Strengthening the Community of Democracies of
the Americas” the signatories committed to
[d]evelop within the OAS, with due regard to applicable treaties and national legisla-
tion, a hemispheric approach to acts of corruption in both the public and private sec-
tors that would include extradition and prosecution of individuals so charged, through
negotiation of a new hemispheric agreement or new arrangements within existing
frameworks for international cooperation.
Id. at 818-19.
162. The first draft for an Inter-American Convention on Corruption was submitted by
Venezuela soon after the Miami Summit.  See Warren Christopher, The Summit of the Americas
Action Plan: Fulfilling a Hemispheric Commitment, DEP’T ST. DISPATCH, June 12, 1995, at 492,
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 8643603 (transcript of Secretary of State Christopher’s re-
marks at a review meeting of the Summit of the Americas before the OAS General Assembly
on June 4, 1995).
163. See Inter-American Convention supra note 1.
164. See, e.g., Richard E. Feinberg, Summit of the Americas: First Steps, DEP’T ST
DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 8643709.
165. Seventeen countries have deposited their ratification instruments.  The United States
has not ratified the Convention.  See Organization of American States, B-58 and B59 Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption <http://www.oas.org/en/prog/juridico/english/Sigs/b-
58.html>.
166. For example, U.S. officials have hailed the OAS and OECD initiatives for committing
its members to implement FCPA-like legislation.  In his remarks at the Council of the Americas
Conference, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated:
The nations of the hemisphere just negotiated an anti-corruption convention through
the OAS.  This unprecedented convention obligates all signatories to the convention to
adopt laws on bribing foreign officials, laws which are the rough equivalent of our For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act here in the United States. As you know, the United States
has reached agreement with the OECD countries to prevent bribes from foreign offi-
cials being tax-deductible as a business expense, and we’re pushing hard for the next
step, and that is to ensure that such bribery is treated as a crime.
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OECD Conventions.  Both Conventions include provisions to crimi-
nalize foreign bribery and improve corporate accounting practices.  In
addition, both include provisions for mutual legal assistance and ex-
tradition.  However, the Inter-American Convention represents a
more ambitious and comprehensive approach to corruption, because
it addresses the demand side of bribery, or “passive” corruption.
a. The Transnational Bribery Offence.  The very title of each
Convention reveals the first major distinction.  Transnational bribery,
or “bribery of a foreign public official,” is central to the OECD
Convention.  The main objective of the OECD Convention is to
address active bribing in international business transactions and deals
directly with this offence in seven of its seventeen articles.  To some
extent this is a reflection of the OECD’s nature as an association of
capital exporters.
By contrast, the Inter-American Convention set itself the
broader objective of fighting corruption in governmental affairs and
deals with the passive and active aspects of bribery, both internal and
external.  Nonetheless, the emphasis of the Inter-American Conven-
tion is on corruption within, evident from the fact that it directly
treats active corruption in only one of its twenty-eight articles.  This
sole provision, Article VII, contains a proviso that may condition the
adoption of the transnational bribery offence:
Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal
system, each State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or
granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their
habitual residence in its territory, and businesses domiciled there,
to a government official of another State, of any article of monetary
value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage,
in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in ex-
change for any act or omission in the performance of that officials
public function.167
Similar language is found only in Article IX, the commitment to
establish illicit enrichment as an offence, and Article XIX, dealing
with the temporal application of the Convention.  It is not in Article
VI, the provision covering the acts of domestic corruption covered by
the Convention.  Thus, read in light of Article X, the Inter-American
Convention establishes a two-tiered regime: 1) active and passive
Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Council of the Americas Conference,
State Dept. Briefing, FED. NEWS SVC., May 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File (emphasis added).
167. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (emphasis added).
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domestic bribery are considered acts of corruption as soon as the
treaty enters into force; and 2) transnational bribery and domestic il-
licit enrichment will not be regarded as acts of corruption under the
Convention, but will be illegal in those signatory countries that have
incorporated these offenses into their domestic legal systems.
However, the scope of Article VII’s proviso “subject to its Con-
stitution and fundamental principles of its legal system” is not clear.
Some authors have pointed out the United States requested this lan-
guage for Article IX as an escape clause for the illicit enrichment of-
fense, which raises serious American constitutional problems.168  Un-
der this reading, Articles VIII and IX give a signatory the option to
refrain from adopting the transnational bribery or illicit enrichment
offenses if either or both are inconsistent with the state’s constitu-
tional restrictions.
An alternative reading is possible.  The language of Article VIII
(“shall prohibit and punish”169) is mandatory and, having been drafted
immediately after the proviso, may be read to enable each signatory
to attach legal consequences in accordance with its own constitution
and domestic legal principles.  In other words, even though the states
“shall” sanction bribery of foreign officials, that treatment may differ
from one country to another according to their respective legal sys-
tems.
By contrast, Article 1 of the OECD Convention establishes the
parties’ unqualified obligation to
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a
criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for
that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or re-
frain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in
order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in
the conduct of international business.170
The Commentaries to the OECD Convention (“OECD Commentar-
ies”) adopted at the negotiating conference clearly indicate that the
implementation of the OECD Convention is subject to the differ-
168. The illicit enrichment offence appears to create a presumption of guilt on the defen-
dant.  This may shift the burden of proof in criminal proceedings and may require a defendant
to declare her own process contrary to U.S. constitutional criminal principles.  See Lucinda A.
Low et al., The Inter-America Convention Against Corruption : A Comparison with the United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT’L L.243, 249, 281-284 (1998).
169. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (emphasis added).
170. OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
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ences in the parties’ legal systems.171  The intention of the Convention
and Article 1 is to establish a lowest common denominator for the
implementation or interpretation measures, if any, to be taken by the
signatories.
To use the words of the Negotiating Conference Commentaries,
the Convention adopts a “functional” approach in order to reach
similarity of results by different means.172 Thus the commentary to Ar-
ticle 1 explains that the provision:
. . . establishes a standard to be met by [the] Parties, but does not
require them to utilize its precise terms in defining the offence un-
der their domestic laws.  A Party may use various approaches to
fulfil its obligations, provided that conviction of a person for the of-
fence does not require proof of elements beyond those which would
be required to be proved if the offence were defined as in the para-
graph.173
With respect to the elements of  illicit conduct, the first apparent
difference between the Conventions is the purpose element of brib-
ery.  The OECD Convention’s description of bribery states that a
briber’s motive is “to obtain or retain business or other improper ad-
vantage in the conduct of international business.”174  This wording
closely follows that used by the FCPA.  The Inter-American Conven-
tion’s wording is broader and requires only that the bribery be “in
connection with any economic or commercial transaction.”175
The OECD Commentaries elaborate on the scope of the offense,
in particular the reach of the phrase “in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage.”  The commentaries explain
that the offense is committed irrespective of whether the briber was
171. The Commentaries to the OECD Convention adopted by the Negotiating Conference
constitute an explicit record of the drafters’ intention to construe the scope of the Convention
and are very helpful in identifying the influence of the FCPA on its development.  No similar
record exists for the Inter-American Convention.  See Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/20nov2e.htm> [hereinaf-
ter Commentaries].
172. The Commentaries state that the OECD Convention “seeks to assure a functional
equivalence among the measures taken by the Parties. . . without requiring uniformity or
changes in fundamental principles of a Party’s legal system.”  Id.
173. The Commentary further illustrates that a statute need not expressly address bribery of
foreign officials in particular; a statute that penalizes bribery of agents in general fully complies
with Article 1.  In other words, countries are not required to add a “bribery of foreign officials”
crime to their criminal codes and define it in the same terms as Article 1 of the OECD Conven-
tion.  A less detailed definition is sufficient to prosecute the conduct.  See id.
174. OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
175. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII.
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duly qualified to legally obtain or retain business.  Furthermore,
“other improper advantage” refers to business outside the briber’s le-
gal authorization (such as operations in absence of a requisite per-
mit).  The Commentaries disqualify local custom, tradition, or neces-
sity as legitimate defenses for the conduct.
However, the OECD Commentaries go on to note that signato-
ries should not treat bribery as an offense where the advantage “was
permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign
public official’s country, including case law.”176  Nor is it a criminal of-
fense to make “small facilitation payments,” which the Commentaries
state “do not constitute payments made ‘to obtain or retain business
or other improper advantage’ within the meaning of paragraph 1. . .
.”177  Such payments “are made to induce public officials to perform
their functions, such as issuing licenses or permits.”178  These two ex-
ceptions are tailored after two features of the FCPA: the legality in
the host country defense and the “grease payments” exception, re-
spectively.179
The 1988 amendments to the FCPA provide that a defendant
may assert as an affirmative defense that payments, gifts, offers, or
promises to convey anything of value were legal under the written law
of the host country.180  It is relevant to note that this provision implic-
itly includes case law within the definition of “written law.”  Because
many countries do not place as much emphasis on case law as the
United States, particularly those that follow the civil legal tradition,
the OECD Commentaries explicitly include the term “case law.”
Some commentators have suggested that the FCPA “legality-in-
the-host-country” affirmative defense could play a useful role in the
international context.  For example, cultural-legal embedded norms,
such as the Korean custom of ttokkap (“rice cake expenses”), may
provide a defense against liability.181  Although it is unclear whether
this was the intention of the OECD Convention, the drafters of the
Commentaries made sure to mirror the FCPA affirmative defense in
almost identical language.
176. Commentaries, supra note 171, art. 1 ¶ 1.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b).
180. See id. § 78dd-2(c).
181. See Joongi Kimand & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against In-
ternational Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 549, 561 (1997) (explaining origins and evolution of Korean custom of giving
gifts or payments in gratitude for deeds done).
POSADAS.DOC 06/22/00  8:20 PM
388 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [10:345
Under the FCPA, “grease payments” are payments made to a
foreign public official in order to ensure the performance of custom-
ary duties.  These payments are not punishable under the FCPA
when made to secure an action ordinarily and commonly performed
by the official.182  Such an action would not include decisions on
whether, or on what terms, to award new business or continue busi-
ness with a specific party.183
The corresponding language of the Commentaries use the term
“small facilitation”184 payments, probably to emphasize that these
payments, in addition to those made to induce the official to perform
a non-discretionary duty, shall be relatively small.  However, the
Commentaries clearly intend to reach the issue of grease payments;
the FCPA is currently the only available legislative example to under-
stand the Commentaries.
In contrast, the Inter-American Convention is silent regarding
both the “affirmative defense” and the “exception.”  Regarding
grease payments, the broader scope of the Inter-American Conven-
tion suggests that its signatories adopted a less tolerant stand against
the practice.  For example, the language used to define the scope of
the offense (“in connection with any economic or commercial transac-
tion”185) could be read to include conduct not covered by the wording
of the OECD Convention (“in order to obtain or retain business or
other improper advantage”186).  It could be argued that grease pay-
ments are always made in connection with a commercial transaction,
putting them within the purview of the Inter-American Convention,
but may not be useful per se to obtain or retain business or other
commercial advantages and would therefore fall outside the coverage
of the OECD Convention.187
182. “Routine governmental action” is defined by the Act as an
action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in obtaining
permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a
foreign country; processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; pro-
viding police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associ-
ated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across coun-
try; providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or actions of a
similar nature.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (h)(4)(A).
183. See id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (h)(4)(B).
184. Commentaries, supra note 171, art. 1 ¶ 9.
185. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII.
186. OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
187. In the specific case of the Korean ttokkap, it may be argued that both the Inter-
American Convention and the OECD Convention would cover the Korean practice, since both
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Another relevant distinction between both conventions is the
OECD Convention’s elaboration on the responsibility of legal per-
sons.  Article 2 of the OECD Convention establishes that each state
shall take measures, in accordance with its own laws, to establish the
liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.188
The OECD Commentaries further clarify that where criminal respon-
sibility is not applicable to legal persons under a state’s legal system
“that [state] shall not be required to establish such criminal responsi-
bilities.”189  However, the OECD Convention further states that those
countries not imposing criminal liability must ensure that their legal
subjects are exposed to other non-criminal consequences, such as civil
liability.190  By contrast, the Inter-American Convention is entirely si-
lent regarding the treatment of legal persons.
In fact, the provisions of the OECD Convention generally pro-
vide greater detail than those of the Inter-American Convention.  For
example, the OECD Convention establishes certain guidelines for
sanctions and calls for reasonable statutes of limitation for the of-
fense; the Inter-American Convention provides no guidance on either
of these issues.191  Similarly the OECD Convention contains an ex-
plicit provision that warns that, although investigations and prosecu-
tions remain subject to the rules and principles of each party, they
“shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic inter-
est, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the iden-
tity of the natural or legal persons involved.”192  The Inter-American
contains no corresponding admonition.
As for similarities, both conventions cover complicity, conspir-
acy, and attempt to bribe a foreign public official.  Both define public
officials similarly, although the Inter-American Convention does not
include officials of international organizations.193  Territorial jurisdic-
conventions require that government officials fail to act in accordance with their official duties.
But note that the Korean Supreme Court has construed a social courtesy exemption that in-
cludes traditional gift-giving practices such as the ttokkap if they are not given in consideration
for the official act.  See Kimand & Kim, supra note 181.
188. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
189. See Commentaries, supra note 171, art. 2.
190. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 3 ¶ 2.
191. The OECD Convention establishes that criminal sanctions should be effective, propor-
tionate, dissuasive, and comparable in range to the applicable sanctions for the bribery of a
party’s own public officials.  See id. art. 3(1).  The Convention provides that statutes of limita-
tion, the period should be sufficient to allow for the investigation and extradition of the offence.
See id. art. 6.
192. Id. art. 5.
193. According to Article 1(4) of the OECD Convention, a foreign public official is:
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tion is the preferred jurisdictional ground for both conventions, and
other legal norms, such as the nationality principle, are similarly fa-
vored.194  Under both conventions, bribery proceeds are seized, but
the Inter-American Convention takes a notable step further by pro-
viding that all or part of the seized property or proceeds may be
shared with the state that assisted in the underlying investigation or
proceeding.195  This provision could be a significant incentive for de-
veloping countries to actively cooperate in prosecuting transnational
bribery cases..
b. Accounting Provisions.  The two conventions have even
more divergent practices when it comes to accounting provisions than
their treatment of bribery.  The Inter-American Convention devotes
only one paragraph to the subject of accounting.  Article III (10)
establishes the obligation of states to consider enacting measures to
create, maintain and strengthen deterrents to the bribery of domes-
tic and foreign government officials, such as mechanisms to ensure
that publicly held companies and other types of associations main-
tain books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately re-
flect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and have sufficient in-
ternal accounting controls to enable their officers to detect corrupt
acts.196
In contrast to this hortatory language, the OECD Convention
considers accounting provisions a necessary complement to its anti-
bribery obligations.  In doing so, it follows the approach taken by the
FCPA.  The OECD Convention establishes two sets of related ac-
counting obligations.  States must first enact necessary measures to
prohibit accounting practices that may be used by companies to facili-
any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country,
whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of
a public international organisation.
OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(4).
Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention establishes that a public official is
any official or employee of the State or its agencies, including those who have been
selected, appointed, or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the
State or in the service of the State, at any level of its hierarchy.
Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
194. Further the OECD Convention provides that conflicts arising out of overlapping juris-
diction will be resolved through consultation between the Parties in order “to [determine] the
most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”  OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 4; see In-
ter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. V.
195. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. XV.
196. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. III(10).
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tate the payment or concealment of bribes.197  Second, states must im-
pose deterrent sanctions and penalties for violators of these measures.
Thus, Article 8, paragraph 1 establishes the signatory’s obligation to
take all necessary measures
within the framework of its laws and regulations regarding the
maintenance of books and records, financial statement disclosures,
and accounting and auditing standards, to prohibit the establish-
ment of off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the books or in-
adequately identified transactions, the recording of non-existent
expenditures, the entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of
their object, as well as the use of false documents, by companies
subject to those laws and regulations, for the purposes of bribing
foreign public officials or hiding such bribery.198
The source of inspiration for this obligation is the record keeping
provision of section 102 of the FCPA.  This section requires every is-
suer to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which in rea-
sonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispo-
sitions of the assets of the issuer.”199  If read only as the obligation to
follow good accounting practices, the FCPA provision may not be in-
trusive, however, the SEC has focused on the qualitative aspects of
the records, rather than on its quantitative ones.  It is not enough to
record all transactions if they are not accurately described.
A commentator has identified certain transactions that have
caused problems in the past and are subject to heightened scrutiny by
the SEC.  These are: (1) political contributions, whether lawful or not;
(2) payoffs to government officials; (3) commercial bribes or kick-
backs; (4) rebates to customers that are illegal or of questionable le-
gality; (5) violations of laws regulating alcohol, tobacco, drugs, nar-
cotics, or firearms; (6) violations of customs or currency control laws;
(7) income tax fraud; (8) self-dealing by insiders; and (9) transactions
where the primary purpose appears to be the manipulation of sales,
earnings or other financial data.200
Regarding non-transparent accounting practices, Article 8 of the
OECD Convention establishes that signatories have the obligation to
provide “effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative
or criminal penalties for such omissions and falsifications in respect of
the books, records, accounts and financial statements of such compa-
197. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
198. Id.
199. DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A
GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 11 (1994).
200. See id. at 12.
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nies.”201  These provisions are related to section V of the 1997 OECD
Recommendation.202  This document identified specific principles with
respect to adequate accounting requirements, independent external
audits, and the use of internal company controls in preventing and de-
tecting bribery.  The principles suggested with respect to accounting
principles are especially helpful in understanding Article 8 of the
OECD Convention:
i) Member countries should require companies to maintain ade-
quate records of the sums of money received and expended by the
company, identifying the matters in respect of which the receipt
and expenditures take place.  Companies should be prohibited from
making off-the-books-transactions or keeping off-the-books-
accounts.
ii) Member countries should require companies to disclose in their
financial statements the full range of material contingent liabilities.
iii) Member countries should adequately sanction accounting omis-
sions, falsifications and fraud.203
The principles regarding independent external audits and inter-
nal company controls relate to issues such as the professional respon-
sibility of accountants, auditors, and directors of a company.204  These
issues were not addressed directly by the OECD Convention.  How-
ever, the obligation to maintain transparent accounting practices will
require many states to re-examine issues of corporate governance, in-
cluding the role of external accountants, auditors and legal counsel.205
c. International Cooperation and Extradition.  Both the Inter-
American Convention and the OECD Convention seek to maximize
opportunities for cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of the conducts prohibited therein.  Parties to both
conventions agreed to provide each other with mutual legal assistance
for the investigation and prosecution of the offences.206  In addition,
the OECD Convention expressly imposes the obligation to cooperate
in non-criminal proceedings brought by a state against a legal person
within the scope of the Convention.207  Both conventions establish that
201. OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
202. See Commentaries, supra note 171, art. 8.
203. Council Revised Recommendation C(97)123/Final on Combating Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, 36 I.L.M. 1016 (1997).
204. In the United States, the SEC has taken the position that the failure of the issuer to es-
tablish a committee to audit certain activities, such as the transfer of funds outside the country,
could constitute a violation of the internal control provisions of the FCPA.  See CRUVER, supra
note 199, at 14.
205. See Commentaries, supra note 171.
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a state cannot refuse a petition for assistance on the basis of bank
secrecy.208  Possibly one of the most relevant features of both
conventions is that they create a unified regime that provide no safe
heavens for transnational bribers.  Article 10 of the OECD
Convention and Article XIII of the Inter-American Convention
ensure that the Parties of the Convention will either extradite or
prosecute the accused.
To facilitate extradition, both conventions are themselves alter-
native extradition treaties.  In the event that a state requiring an ex-
tradition does not have a specific treaty in place with the particular
host country, the Conventions can provide the legal basis for extradi-
tion.  In other words, the OECD and the Inter-American Conven-
tions will function as extradition treaties in the absence of agreements
between two parties to any of the conventions, where one of the par-
ties makes extradition conditional on the existence of an extradition
treaty with the requesting Party.209  Finally, the double criminality
principle will be implicitly satisfied by the sole application of the con-
ventions.210
d. Passive Corruption: The Demand Side of the Equation.  As
has been suggested, the theme that permeates the Inter-American
Convention is governmental corruption.  This is sometimes known as
passive corruption because of its focus on the official as recipient or
solicitor of the bribe.211  From an economic perspective, the
governmental official constitutes the demand side of the bribery
equation.
The relevance of passive corruption in the Inter-American Con-
vention is expressly stated in its objectives.  Article II establishes that
the two purposes of the Convention are strengthening the signatories’
methods of combating corruption and regulating state cooperation to
206. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. XIV; OECD Convention, supra note
2, art. 9.
207. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.
208. The OECD Convention additionally establishes that the absence of dual criminality
cannot be invoked to deny assistance.  See id. arts 9(2), 9(3); Inter-American Convention, supra
note 1, art. XVI.
209. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. XIII; OECD Convention, supra note
2, art. 10.
210. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. XIII; OECD Convention, supra note
2, art. 10.
211. This does not imply that the government official is a passive victim of the briber.  In
fact, many times it is the governmental official who plays a more active and demanding role
than the briber.  See, e.g., Commentaries, supra note 171, at 1.
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advance this objective.  “Corruption” is the operative term preferred
by the Inter-American Convention over “bribery,” as used by the
OECD Convention.
Article VI of the Inter-American Convention is a core provision
because it establishes the acts of corruption covered.  These acts in-
clude solicitation, acceptance, offer, or delivery of improper pay-
ments; the illicit use of a position of authority for the official’s own
benefit; the fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from
that position of authority; and participation in any of these acts as ac-
complice, collaborator or conspirator.212  This list of crimes refers to
domestic acts of corruption and is to be extended to the conduct cov-
ered by the provisions of transnational bribery and illicit enrichment
of Articles VII and IX, when Parties domestically adopt (or as the
case may be have already adopted) this conduct as criminal.  Finally,
Article XI refers to other undesired conduct, such as the improper
use of classified or confidential information by government officials.213
Article XI also allows the signatories to add other types of conduct to
the list of prohibited acts at a later date.214  As in the case of transna-
tional bribes and illicit enrichment, the acts described by Article XI
are covered by the Convention as soon as they incorporated into the
legal system of a signatory, if the conduct is not already prohibited.
When considered in context with the extradition provisions of
the Inter-American Convention, the structure described above re-
veals, at least in theory, an interesting intention of the Inter-
American Convention.  The Convention has the effect of creating an
“Inter-American network” for international legal cooperation in
fighting corruption.  In other words, the Inter-American Convention,
if fully implemented, represents a commitment by governments
throughout the region to remove safe havens not only for bribers (as
with the OECD Convention) but also for corrupt government offi-
cials.  This objective may become a significant policy goal for the fu-
ture development of conventional obligations in this sphere.
212. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art VI.
213. See id. art. XI.
214. See id.
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C. Other International Initiatives
1. The European Union
a. Combating Fraud Against European Community Financial
Interests.  The European Union has focused its anti-corruption efforts
on combating fraud against the financial interests of the European
Community (EC).  Although this fight is not new, it has gained
strength in recent years and has benefited from the international anti-
corruption movement.  This section will briefly describe the
development of anti-fraud initiatives in the EC leading to the
expansion of the Community’s agenda to include the current anti-
corruption proposals.
By way of introduction, it is interesting to note that the develop-
ment of measures to protect the EC financial interests has faced a ju-
risdictional conflict hurdle. Although the EC is responsible for the in-
tegrity of its overall budget, it must rely on its member states for
criminal prosecution of fraud and recovery of funds where appropri-
ate.215  Disparities in the way in which member states construe and en-
force their criminal statutes has been a matter of concern in the fight
against fraud.
In the 1960s and 1970s, anti-fraud initiatives received little sup-
port, as European institutions were occupied with the task of consoli-
dating authority.216  Enforcement was erratic and uneven during the
1980s.217  Late in that decade, the principle of assimilation developed
by the European Court of Justice was applied to fraud in the EC,
marking an important step forward in addressing the jurisdictional
problem.218  The 1989 Greek Maize Case219 established that member
states need to ensure that violations of Community law are treated, in
both substance and procedure, analogously to domestic law violations
of similar nature and importance.  Authorities must act with the same
diligence required by national standards, and penalties imposed on
violators of EC law must be proportionate to the offense while deter-
ring future violations.220  Unfortunately, the assimilation principle
215. See SIMONE WHITE, PROTECTION OF THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES: THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD AND CORRUPTION 7 (1998).
216. See id. at 7-11.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 12-13.
219. See Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 2965.
220. See WHITE, supra note 215, at 12-13.
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makes monitoring difficult, since national law enforcers enjoy a great
deal of discretion in the application of their domestic law.221
Starting in 1988, the Commission increasingly relied upon puni-
tive sanctions that again depend on national enforcement.222  In the
early 1990s, stricter regulations and control measures were devel-
oped.223  However, both these types of initiatives were merely piece-
meal and sectorial responses only adding to the already complex
regulatory environment.224
Since then, there has been a policy shift towards increasing coop-
eration.225  In 1995, Europe took two important steps.  First, Council
Regulation 2988/95 established a legal framework for Community
administrative sanctions, including sanctions to be applied by national
authorities.226  Second, the Convention on the Protection of Commu-
nity Financial Interests was concluded and published in the Official
Journal.227  The Convention seeks to strengthen cooperation, promote
horizontal regulation, and harmonize rules and policies.228  The Con-
vention defines fraud affecting the EC budget and obligates members
to, among other duties, impose criminal penalties in cases of serious
fraud to cooperate in ascertaining jurisdiction for enforcement.229
In that same year, the European Council adopted the Protocol to
the Convention on the Protection of Community Financial Interests
and issued a draft Anti-Corruption Convention.  Both instruments
deal with bribery of foreign officials and are discussed in the follow-
ing subsection.
b. Current Steps to Address Corruption.  The  EU has recently
taken steps to to include corruption within its anti-fraud agenda.  Two
instruments have been approved by the Council of Europe: the
Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the Communities’
Financial Interests (“EC Corruption Protocol”),230 and a general
221. Nonetheless, the principle has been enshrined in Article 209 of the Maastricht Treaty.
See id.
222. For example, agricultural regulation is one of the main components of the European
Union’s common policy and budget through the Common Agricultural Policy.  See id. at 14.
223. For example, via reporting obligations and audit programs.  See id. at 15.
224. See id.
225. For example, the establishment of an advisory body to coordinate Commission and
Member States anti-fraud efforts.  See id. at 17.
226. See id. at 18.
227. A previous draft of this Convention had been rejected by the member states in 1976.
See id. at 10, 18-19.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 19.
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convention on corruption (“EU Corruption Convention”).231  Neither
has been ratified by the member states as is required for them to
enter into force.  It has been pointed out that the ratification process
is often slow to the extent that the practical effect of the instrument
awaiting ratification is neutralized.232  The OECD Convention may
have helped to mitigate this ratification problem in the area of
corruption: most member states of the EC have and will continue to
modify their domestic laws to comply with the OECD Convention,
notwithstanding the pending EC legislation.  It is ironic that member
states have strengthened their anti-corruption commitments abroad
but not within the European system.233
The EC Corruption Protocol (read in conjunction with the PIF
Convention) and the EU Corruption Convention are parallel docu-
ments.  They share similar language but are distinguished by the
scope of their application.  While the EC Corruption Protocol applies
to corruption affecting the financial interests of the European Com-
munities, the EU Corruption Convention is not restricted to this area
alone.  This distinction is evident in the definition of active and pas-
sive corruption.  The EC Corruption Protocol defines passive corrup-
tion as:
the deliberate action of an official, who directly or through an in-
termediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind whatso-
ever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such
an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his
duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official du-
ties in a way which damages or is likely to damage the European
Communities’ financial interests.234
Active corruption is defined as:
the deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly or
through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to
an official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain
from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his
functions in breach of his official duties in a way which damages or
230. Council Act of 27 September 1996 Drawing up a Protocol to the Convention on the
Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests, 1996 O.J. (C 313) 1 [hereinafter
EC Corruption Protocol].
231. Convention Drawn up on the Basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European
Union on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or
Officials of Member States of the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1 [hereinafter EU Cor-
ruption Convention].
232. See WHITE, supra note 215, at 158.
233. The OECD Convention may also be used at both the European and international level.
234. 1996 O.J. (C 313) 1.
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is likely to damage the European Communities’ financial inter-
ests.235
The EU Corruption Convention defines passive and active corruption
in exactly the same terms but omits the final reference to damage
against the EC.236  Thus, the EU Corruption Convention covers cor-
ruption by Community or member state officials237 whether or not the
fraud has an impact on the finances of the EC.
It has also been suggested that the EC Corruption Protocol and
the EU Corruption Convention differ in another substantial aspect.
White points out that a narrow reading of the EC Corruption Proto-
col in conjunction with the EU Corruption Convention suggests that
cooperation is restricted to criminal matters.  However, a broader in-
terpretation of the EU Corruption Convention suggests that member
states are committed to cooperate in civil and administrative pro-
ceedings as well.238  This is a relevant distinction considering the diffi-
culties of international criminal cooperation, the fact that administra-
tive authorities are in most instances in a better position to cooperate,
and the importance of civil recovery of illicit advantages obtained
from corruption.
Both instruments adopt the assimilation principle, which com-
mits the member states to similarly apply the definitions of corruption
to both national and European officials.239  The EC Corruption Proto-
col and the EU Corruption Convention establish that member states
shall ensure that corruption is punishable by effective, proportionate,
and dissuasive criminal penalties, without prejudice to the exercise of
domestic disciplinary powers.240  They commit the member states to
impose criminal liability on heads of businesses, or persons in deci-
sion-making or control positions, for the corrupt acts of persons un-
der their control acting on behalf of the business.241  Jurisdiction is to
be exercised by the member states on the basis of the principles of
235. Id.
236. 1997 O.J. (C 195) 2.
237. Both instruments define official to mean any Community or national official, including
any national official of another Member State.
238. See WHITE, supra note 215, at 158-59.
239. See EC Corruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 4; EU Corruption Convention, supra
note 231, art. 4.
240. See EC Corruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 5; EU Corruption Convention, supra
note 231, art. 5.
241. See EC Corruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 7; EU Corruption Convention, supra
note 231, art. 6.
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territoriality and active and passive nationality.242  Both instruments
create the obligation to extradite or prosecute an offender.243  The non
bis in idem protection, providing that a person cannot be prosecuted
or punished twice for the same act, is found in both the convention
and the protocol.244  The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction
over disputes under both agreements if no compromise is reached af-
ter six months.245
When compared to the OECD Convention, the European in-
struments address only the corresponding international cooperation
problems of corruption, but not its accounting aspects.  In attacking
corruption, the European instruments are more ambitious, covering
both passive and active corruption, thus reflecting a similar approach
to the OAS Convention.  In addition, although the EC Corruption
Protocol is limited to acts affecting the financial interests of the
Community, the EU Corruption Convention— in contrast to the
OECD Convention—addresses corruption plainly, without regard to
the purpose of the corrupt act.  These features represent the latest ef-
forts in the fight against fraud and corruption within Europe.  They
also reflect the greater concern for corruption in an integrated market
where the growing common purse is entrusted to both national and
Community officials and where international borders for business and
crime disappear faster than the borders for international cooperation.
2. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Procurement Guidelines.  The World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) did not take an active role against corruption
242. Under Article 6 of the EC Corruption Protocol and Article 7 of the EU Corruption
Convention, the territoriality principle applies where “the offence is committed in whole or in
part within its territory” and where “the offender is a Community official working for a Euro-
pean Community institution or a body set up in accordance with the Treaties establishing the
European Communities which has its headquarters in the Member State in question.”  EC Cor-
ruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 6; EU Corruption Convention, supra note 231, art. 7.  The
active nationality principle applies where “the offender is one of its nationals or one of its offi-
cials” and the passive nationality principle applies where “the offence is committed against one
of the persons” defined by the Convention as an official “who is one of its nationals.”  EC Cor-
ruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 6; EU Corruption Convention, supra note 231, art. 7.
243. See EC Corruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 7; EU Corruption Convention, supra
note 231, art. 8.
244. See EC Corruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 7; EU Corruption Convention, supra
note 231, art. 10.
245. See EC Corruption Protocol, supra note 230, art. 8; EU Corruption Convention, supra
note 231, art. 12.
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until the emergence of anti-corruption initiatives in the mid 1990s.246
The World Bank first focused on measures to promote transparency
in projects it was funding.  It then developed its own anti-corruption
strategy that includes measures to strengthen internal anti-corruption
controls.247  The IMF has focused on promoting the importance of
fighting corruption as a principle of good governance.
The World Bank’s corruption efforts have focused on improving
the procurement processes of the Bank’s funded projects.248  In 1997,
the Bank revised its Procurement Guidelines as part of its overall ini-
tiative against corruption.249  As part of its procurement policy, the
World Bank has also increased its specialized personnel in charge of
supervising the procurement process and has initiated an independent
audit program to make sure that Bank procurement guidelines are
observed.250  The Bank has taken action in those cases where guide-
lines have not been followed, including canceling funds and initiating
civil proceedings for the recovery of spent funds.251
Under the leadership of President Wolfensohn, and in particular
since 1997, the Bank has increased its efforts to combat corruption
within the organization.252  For example, there is now a 24-hour tele-
phone hotline for callers (who may choose to remain anonymous) to
report fraud and corruption.  The Bank’s new Oversight Committee
on Fraud and Corruption reviews all allegations of fraud and corrup-
tion received by any member of the World Bank Group.253
246. This may be due to concerns that it not be construed as an interference in the internal
political affairs of the lender countries, a sensitive issue during the seventies and eighties.  See
Kimberly Ann Elliot, Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommen-
dations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 88, at 175, 212.
247. There are four main themes of the World Bank’s anticorruption strategy: (1) prevent-
ing corruption in Bank projects; (2) helping countries reduce corruption; (3) mainstreaming
anti-corruption; and (4) supporting international efforts to reduce corruption.  See Anti-
Corruption Knowledge Resource Center (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/
publicsector/anticorrupt/>.
248. See Mark Pieth, International Cooperation to Combat Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 88, at 119, 127.
249. See Anti-Corruption Knowledge Resource Center, supra note 247.  The Bank’s Guide-
lines are addressed in more detail in Part III of this Article.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Wolfensohn has noted that if the Bank is going to campaign against corruption in the
borrowing countries “we have to be absolutely certain that we hold ourselves to the highest
standards on the inside.”  Id.
253. The Committee is composed of high level World Bank officials, including the Managing
Director, the Deputy General Counsel, the Auditor-General, the Manager of the Office of Pro-
fessional Ethics, and the Vice President of the Operational Core Services Network.  The Com-
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As noted before, the IMF has also taken some recent steps in
support of the international anti-corruption efforts, in particular in
how the institution promotes good governance principles among its
lenders.  In the words of Managing Director Michel Camdessus, the
IMF traditionally concentrated “on those aspects of good governance
that are most closely related to our surveillance of macroeconomic
policies.”254  However, in recent years the IMF has expanded its ap-
proach to the concept to include combating corruption.
On September 29, 1996, the IMF Interim Committee adopted the
declaration entitled “Partnership for Sustainable Growth,” in which
the organization recognized that a broader range of institutional re-
form is necessary to lay the basis for sustained growth.  These reforms
include “ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and ac-
countability of the public sector, and tackling corruption.”255  The IMF
has thus acknowledged that fighting corruption and increasing gov-
ernmental accountability are important good governance principles
that can affect trust and sustainable growth, and it has committed to
focus its attention on these issues.256
The IMF established guidelines (“IMF Guidelines”) to define its
involvement in corruption issues consistent with its role as an interna-
tional lending institution while remaining sensitive to national
authorities.257  In this regard, it has underscored that it does not intend
to move in the direction of becoming a financial guardian of member
countries, and that “instances of corruption should be addressed on
the basis of economic consideration within its mandate.”258  The
guidelines explain that the institution should get involved in corrup-
tion issues where its impact on good governance might threaten mac-
roeconomic efforts.259  While the IMF Guidelines acknowledge that
governments are more receptive to corruption issues when they
mittee reports directly to the Bank’s President and has authority to direct the initiation of inves-
tigations.  See id.
254. Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director, Address to the United Nations Economic
and Social Council (July 2, 1997) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.
htm>.
255. Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth Interim Committee Declaration, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Sept. 29, 1996) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1996/pr9649.htm>.
256. See id.
257. See The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note (Approved by the IMF
Executive Board, July 25, 1997) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.
htm>.
258. Id.
259. See id.
POSADAS.DOC 06/22/00  8:20 PM
402 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [10:345
themselves initiate efforts to address the problem, they warn that lack
of government interest—or even opposition—should not prevent
IMF staff from bringing corruption to the attention of appropriate
government officials when corruption may affect development or sta-
bilization measures sponsored by the IMF.260
The Procurement Guidelines of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (IBRD) have been a key instrument
in that institution’s anti-corruption strategy.  Although the member
states, not the IBRD itself, conduct the procurement processes of
IBRD-financed projects, the IBRD has strengthened its supervisory
role through a number of measures.  For one, the IBRD has estab-
lished a mechanism by which a borrower may introduce into bid
forms a requirement that bidders observe the country’s laws against
fraud and corruption.261  The borrower can introduce the project for
approval by the IBRD.  This approval is subject to a number of condi-
tions; for example, the borrower may have to produce an anti-
corruption report, formulate a general corruption strategy, provide
the IBRD with its fraud and corruption laws, and establish appropri-
ate channels to investigate fraud and corruption complaints.262  This
mechanism seeks to promote transparency in the procurement of
IBRD financed projects.  The IBRD has also issued an ethical guide
for its staff handling procurement matters.263
Of particular relevance is paragraph 1.15 of the IBRD Procure-
ment Guidelines.264  In addition to defining corrupt and fraudulent
practice, paragraph 1.15 establishes the authority of the organization
to react to corrupt practices in three ways:
a) Reject a proposal for award if found that the bidder has engaged
260. See id.
261. See Preventing Corruption in Bank Projects: Procurement Guidelines (visited Nov. 23,
1999) <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/prm>.
262. See id.
263. See Ethical Guide for Bank Staff Handling Procurement Matters in Bank Financed
Projects (Apr. 23, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/ethicalguide.htm>.
264. Procurement Guidelines for Preventing Fraud and Corruption (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/2116.htm>.  Corrupt practice is defined as the “of-
fering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public of-
ficial in the procurement process or in contract execution.”  Id.  Fraudulent practice is defined
as
a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement process or the execu-
tion of a contract to the detriment of the Borrower, and includes a collusive practices
among bidders (prior to or after bid submission) designed to establish bid prices at ar-
tificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and
open competition.
Id.
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in corrupt or fraudulent practice and declare a firm permanently or
temporary ineligible to compete for IBRD financed projects where
found to have engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practice;
b) Cancel the portion of the loan allocated to a contract if at any
time determines fraud or corruption was performed by representa-
tives of the borrower or a beneficiary of the loan and the country
has not take appropriate action to remedy the situation, and;
c) Require that IBRD finance projects include a contractual
authorization for the Bank to inspect Suppliers and Contractors ac-
counts and records and to have them audited by Bank appointed
auditors.265
The IBRD reports suggest that the institution has been success-
fully enforcing paragraph 1.15 of the guidelines.  As of November
1999, the World Bank reported that fifteen allegations of corruption
and fraud had been received since the first phase of the anti-
corruption initiative in 1998; two staff members had been terminated
for the misuse of $110,000 of Bank funds; and a positive civil judg-
ment had been obtained against a former staff member.  Fifty-four
projects had been audited by independent firms, and forty contracts
with a value of $40 million had been declared a misprocurement.266
3. The World Trade Organization.  The World Trade
Organization (WTO) has not yet fulfilled the expectations of those
who had wished to see the organization become the vehicle to expand
the international anti-corruption agenda.  Since the preparatory work
for the first Ministerial Meeting at Singapore, the United States’
Trade Representative has pushed the issue of bribery in international
business transactions.267  In particular, the U.S. government urged the
WTO to pursue negotiations on an agreement on transparency in
government procurement, but the proposal did not find support
among other trading nations.268  In fact, the American  initiative found
stern opposition from Asian governments.269  Notwithstanding this
265. Id.
266. See Anti-Corruption Knowledge Resource Center, supra note 247.
267. In February 1996, then-U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor wrote a letter to
WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero warning that “continuing problems with bribery and
corruption in the markets of WTO members may compromise the progressive elimination of
trade barriers we worked so hard to achieve.”  Kantor calls for WTO campaign against bribery,
corruption, Agence France Presse, Feb. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Group library, All
file.
268. Elliot, supra note 246, at 224.
269. For example, according to one news report, in response to American efforts to add cor-
ruption to the agenda of the first WTO Ministerial Meeting, the Indonesian Trade and Industry
Minister declared that “any effort to link this new issue to trade will be detrimental to the func-
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setback, a victory for anti-corruption initiatives was achieved at
Singapore, where the WTO agreed to establish a working group “to
conduct a study on transparency in government procurement
practices, taking into account national policies, and, based on this
study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate
agreement.”270
Efforts to fully inject corruption into the WTO agenda have con-
tinued to date without much success.  Though the current WTO Gov-
ernment Procurement Agreement can be read as an important step
towards transparency in international procurement procedures, the
Agreement’s scope is still limited and many questions remain in the
area.  The organization has continued its work to produce a global
agreement on transparency in government procurement, which inter-
estingly approaches the principle of transparency not as a vehicle to
better market access but as a goal in of itself.271  The day might not be
far off when corruption issues are brought into an international dis-
pute or when the work done at the OECD and other multinational
organizations is ripe for multilateral discussion at the WTO. 272
4. International Non-Governmental Organizations.  One of the
most promising developments with respect to the role of NGOs was
the 1993 establishment (by a group of former executives of the World
Bank) of an international non-governmental organization entirely
tioning of the WTO.” ASEAN slams US call to include corruption on WTO agenda, Agence
France Presse, Apr. 25, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS,  News Group library, All file.
270. Transparency in Government Procurement (last updated November 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/minist1/17proc_e.htm>.  See also Battling Corruption, J. COMMERCE,
Dec. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Group library, All file.
271. The WTO working group on transparency in government procurement has held nine
meetings since it first met in May 1997 and is now devoted to the systematic study of issues iden-
tified as important in relation to transparency:
definition and scope of government procurement; procurement methods; publication
of information on national legislation and procedures; information on procurement
opportunities, tendering, and qualification procedures; time-periods; transparency of
decisions on qualification; transparency of decisions on contract awards; domestic re-
view procedures; other matters related to transparency; maintenance of records of
proceedings; information technology; language; fight against bribery and corruption;
information to be provided to other governments (notification); WTO dispute settle-
ment procedures; and technical cooperation and special and differential treatment for
developing countries.
Transparency in Government Procurement, supra note 270.
272. For example, in 1997, a number of American steel companies requested the U.S. gov-
ernment to advance a claim in the WTO against South Korean steel industry subsidies.  The al-
legations came amidst the backdrop of the collapse of the Korean Hanbo Group and a loans for
kickbacks scandal.  See US Steel group seeks WTO action on Hanbo, Agence France-Presse,
Feb. 21, 1997, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database.
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committed to anti-corruption initiatives.273  Transparency
International (TI) has been extremely active in this field, raising the
visibility of the subject around the world, and it is steadily increasing
its national chapters to carry out its objectives locally.274
One of the most effective tools that the organization has used to
promote public and governmental corruption awareness has been its
now renowned Corruption Perception Index, a poll that rates coun-
tries by their perceived tolerance of governmental corruption.275  TI
has recently published a Bribe Payers Index, which ranks developed
nations by the extent to which they are perceived to use corrupt prac-
tices in international business transactions.276
Another proposal developed by TI has been securing free-
corruption procurement areas through a concept called “Islands of
Integrity: The Integrity Pact.”  TI has been promoting the Integrity
Pact concept since the organization’s inception.277  The Integrity Pact
is an joint commitment (that includes the government agency admin-
istering the procurement) to adhere to a public sector procurement
process in which they will refrain from corrupt activities and will be
subject to sanctions if they do not.  There are five main features of the
Integrity Pact.
1) The companies’ formal commitment not to engage in corrup-
tion in order to obtain or secure business, as part of the signed
tender document.  This commitment should be supported by
an anti-corruption Code of Conduct and a compliance pro-
gram clearly stating the company’s policy prohibiting all
forms of bribery and collusion.278
273. Patrick Glynn et al., supra note 135, at 16.
274. See Transparency International, Mission Statement (Apr. 1997) <http://www.
transparency.de/mission.html>.
275. Transparency International, Press Release: New Poll Shows Many Leading Exporters
Using Bribes: (Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.transparency. de/documents/cpi/index.html>.
276. This survey was conducted on a total of 770 senior executives of major companies,
chartered accountants, chambers of commerce, major commercial banks, and law firms in four-
teen emerging market countries.  See id.
277. Transparency International, Islands of Integrity: The Integrity Pact (visited Nov. 30,
1999) <http://www.transparency.de/activities/integrity-pact.html>.
278. If a company does not have a code of conduct and compliance program in place, it can
draft one for that particular contract.  The code of conduct and compliance program should in-
clude at least the company’s policy regarding gifts and entertainment, internal controls, external
audits and record-keeping, and applicable sanctions, including termination of employment.  It
should be distributed to all managers and employees, who should acknowledge receipt and be
trained in the application of the policy.  See id.
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2) The commitment by the government body administering the
procurement that it will commit to prevent corrupt activities.
This includes the fair and full enforcement of its anti-
corruption laws.
3) The disclosure of past and intended payments to agents or
third parties.279
4) Sanctions and an arbitral mechanism to enforce violations.280
Sanctions should include denial or cancellation of the con-
tract, liability for damages, and debarment of the offender
from all business with the government for a period of time.281
5) Participation of civil society in the procurement process.  Ad-
ditionally, the Pact recommends public disclosure of the
award decision and grounds of the decision.282
The concept of the Integrity Pact is to be developed by countries
through the establishment of “Islands of Integrity.”  This is a gradual
approach by which the Integrity Pact concept can be adopted first for
a particular procurement process or procurement in a specific market.
The Integrity Pact seeks to provide competitors with confidence that
the procurement will be corruption-free, thus creating an incentive
for appropriate behavior by all parties involved.  The availability of
sanctions and international arbitration provides an additional incen-
tive.283
The Integrity Pact has only been adopted by a few countries in
limited, specific projects.284  In 1997, some African leaders committed
279. The Integrity Pact requires that the disclosure be done at the bidding stage and be for-
mally recorded and reported during the execution stage by the successful bidder.  Certification
by senior management is required to prevent senior managers and CEOs from disclaiming
knowledge of the activities.  See id.
280. In accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
merce.  See id.
281. Liability for damages should extend to the government as well as to the competing bid-
ders.  Damage claims by both the government and the competitors should be in the form of liq-
uidated damages equivalent to a certain percent of the contract value, except where the claim-
ant can prove the actual damage.  See id.
282. Id.
283. However, litigating is always a risk, even in an arbitral context.  Though governments
may be particularly averse to arbitration, companies also perceive a risk in going after a gov-
ernment where they regularly conduct business or where they expect to conduct business in the
future.  The author is unaware of any cases so far under this mechanism.  It is nonetheless an
interesting idea worthy of further study and development.
284. Examples of the use of the Transparency Pact include a rehabilitation project in Ecua-
dor in 1994, the 1996 privatization of telecommunications in Panama, and the procurement
practices of the provincial government of Mendoza, Argentina for the past three years.  See
Transparency International, supra note 277.
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to introduce the concept in their continent and the Indonesia has
agreed to use the Integrity Pact in international finance projects as
part of a national program to curb corruption.  The concept has influ-
enced other international initiatives in the field of government pro-
curement and is no doubt a creative and innovative proposal to ad-
dress the prisoners’ dilemma in a procurement environment tainted
by expectations of bribery.285
TI has also promoted a comprehensive governmental reform ap-
proach through the concept of national integrity systems.286  As part of
this effort, TI publishes a Source Book to document the best anti-
corruption practices, and it has organized a number of anti-corruption
workshops and conferences.  For example, the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) has been one of TI’s financial and
logistical supporters and also a major organizer of anti-corruption ini-
tiatives through its own programs.287
Motivated in large measure by the 1994 OECD Recommenda-
tion, other non-governmental organizations also joined the efforts to
combat corruption.  The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
revived its interest in the issue and established a committee to review
the 1977 report on illicit payments in international commercial trans-
actions and suggest new recommendations.288  The ICC adopted the
new report and recommendations on March 26, 1996.  The new report
confirmed the suitability of the three-level approach of the 1977 re-
port, but acknowledged that international leadership in the issue had
shifted from the U.N. to the OECD.  The new recommendations re-
drafted the code of conduct to include all types of corruption, not
only that associated with obtaining or retaining business, as defined
by the 1976 rules.289  The new code of conduct also eliminated the dis-
pute panel proposed by the 1976 code.290  The ICC has since taken
specific steps to promote the code of conduct, including establishing a
285. Participants in certain procurement processes might expect that notwithstanding the
strength of their bid, they should bribe lest their competitors beat them to the punch.  See id.
286. See Transparency International, National Integrity Systems (visited Nov. 30, 1999)
<http://www.transparency.de/activities/national-integrity.html>.  For a study of the role of na-
tional integrity systems in the fight against corruption see PETER LANGSETH ET. AL, THE ROLE
OF NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION (EDI Working Papers, 1997).
287. These include its programs on economic restructuring, rule of law, open and account-
able governments, and free media and civil society.  See Tamesis, supra note 118, at 136-37.
288. The Chairman this time was François Vincke of Belgium, General Counsel of Petro-
fina.  See Heimann, supra note 88, at 147, 151.
289. See id.
290. See id.
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Standing Committee charged with coordinating the sixty-two ICC na-
tional committees’ work on corruption, and cooperating with the
OECD and other international organizations working on this sub-
ject.291
In 1995, the World Economic Forum, the largest international
organization of business executives, established the Davos Group to,
inter alia, promote the study of corruption.292  The Davos Group in-
cludes chief business executives, law-enforcement officials, and other
experts.293  Other policy institutions, think-tanks, and business organi-
zations have also joined the recent efforts to promote a corruption-
free political and business environment.294
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Lessons and Questions
1. Lessons.  It is unquestionable that the international
movement to combat corruption and bribery has gained momentum.
The multiplication of international efforts suggests that this
momentum will continue in the near future.  A review of the history
of these developments, however, warns that it will not be free of
difficulties.  Corruption is and will continue to be a sensitive issue and
setbacks should be expected in many fronts.
One of the key issues for the OECD and Inter-American Con-
ventions will be implementation and enforcement.  The congressional
hearings on the 1976 FCPA can provide valuable lessons on this pro-
cess, not only from the information provided about how corrupt prac-
tices were conducted, but because from the experience of the process
itself.  Governments should consider, and international efforts should
support, any effort to conduct legislative or other governmental
studies and inquiries about the modus operandi of domestic and in-
ternational corruption.  This should be done in an atmosphere of
public participation and transparency, and there should even be in-
centives to provide information.  The author acknowledges that the
OECD Convention implementation agenda is tight, and that most
291. See id. at 152.
292. See Patrick Glynn et al., supra note 135, at 16.
293. For example, the Interpol Secretary General is a member of the Davos Group.  See id.
294. See, e.g., Center for International Private Enterprise, Combating Corruption (visited
Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.cipe.org.efn/corruption.html>.
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countries will have enacted such legislation by the publication of this
Article, but this should not preclude subsequent efforts to improve
these or other legal measures on corruption.
The great strength of the FCPA is that it was a tailored response
to an issue seriously investigated and studied by Congress, resulting in
legislation that impressed upon the consciousness of the business sec-
tor.  Nations may improve the fight against corruption if they can
openly tackle the particular issues of corruption in their domestic and
international context.  Amnesty or measures to prevent future acts
without punishing past transgressions (vis á vis the use of injunctive
powers by the SEC in 1976) should not be disregarded.295  The grow-
ing amount of research done in this area, the information generated
and made public on anti-corruption strategies, and the participation
of non-governmental organizations to encourage public participation
are valuable tools in such processes.
At least one other general lesson merits a brief comment.  Cor-
ruption is not inherent to developing governments, businessmen, or
citizens.  Although bribery and corruption manifest themselves dif-
ferently in different countries, the approach that should permeate in-
ternational efforts to combat corruption and bribery must be free of
prejudice.  Corruption is a serious allegation and should be treated
seriously, wherever it occurs.
Revisiting the development of this issue warns against a one-
sided approach to the problem.  The OECD Convention is a relevant
development, but there is a danger that it will be perceived solely as
an accommodation of the interests of the Northern/Western devel-
oped countries.  Other international initiatives could be similarly
tainted, reminiscent of the challenges caused by the illicit payments
agreement during the eighties.  There is today a renewed critical atti-
tude in certain sectors of society against the globalization and liberali-
zation trends of the nineties.  Furthermore, many governments that
have made efforts in the last decade to move towards democratic and
free market regimes are being challenged by important sectors of
their societies for the rampant corruption directly or indirectly pro-
voked by their “reformist” elites.
Some international organizations, such as the OECD, the WTO,
and the IBRD, have been subjected to public criticism for their lack
of decision-making transparency.  This cynicism could lead to resis-
tance from developing countries to the expansion of an international
295. See discussion supra notes 14-16, and accompanying text.
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anti-corruption regime, one which is perceived to reflect only the
trading interests of developed countries and multinational corpora-
tions and does not legitimately address issues such as governmental
excess and the role of the private elite in the liberalization and priva-
tization programs.  International initiatives against corruption should
thus strive to strike a balanced approach, so as not to be perceived
simply as the accommodations of the exporting nations to resolve a
competitive problem amongst themselves.  The increasing participa-
tion of civil society and non-governmental organizations in this
movement offers hope.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the OECD Convention is a
relevant step in the development of the treatment of bribery under
international law.  Leaving aside for the moment its substantive de-
velopments and the questions raised about its implementation and
enforcement, this Article submits that its contribution to the devel-
opment of a common language and definitions in this field is highly
relevant in itself.  In addition, the OECD Convention may grow in
membership and eventually become the model upon which is built a
more comprehensive and balanced regime.
2. Questions
a. Questions under International Economic Law.  Though
bribery and corruption initiatives have not made much progress
within the WTO, the interplay between them and the WTO should be
expected to continue.296  For example, it has been pointed out that the
development of the international trade regime helps to reduce
corruption because it subjects governments to commitments that are
difficult to revoke and provides companies a more predictable legal
environment.297  This proposition leads one to ask questions.  What is
296. There are, however, signs of encouragement, such as the continued work of the Trans-
parency in Procurement Working Group and the aggressive expectations of important trading
nations like the United States.  Note, for example, President Clinton’s statement at the last
WTO Ministerial Meeting in Geneva:
In an era of global financial markets, prosperity depends upon government practices
that are based on the rule of law instead of bureaucratic caprice, cronyism, or corrup-
tion. . . By next year, all Member of the WTO should agree that government purchases
should be made through open and fair bidding.  This single reform could open up $3
trillion of business to competition around the world.
President Bill Clinton, Remarks at WTO Ministerial Meeting (May 18, 1998), (transcript avail-
able at <http://www.wto.org/anniv/clinton.htm>).
297. For example, the WTO trade rules to limit and eliminate quotas.  The allocation of
quotas has been cited as a source of corruption in many countries.  See 10 benefits of the WTO
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the real impact of the WTO system in limiting corruption?  What
trade obligations are more closely related to preventing corruption?
Some commentators have begun to explore whether the WTO is an
appropriate forum to deal with transnational bribery and how the
organization can deal effectively with it.298  Questions about the
transparency of the decision-making process within the WTO and
other international organizations and about the role of civil society
are also relevant.299  The development of these two issues at the
international level will have an impact on its development at the
national level, and thus contribute to more accountable national and
international regimes, a self-preventing anti-corruption measure.
But whether corruption is fully adopted within the WTO agenda,
the issue of bribery of foreign officials in international business trans-
actions is one of interest for international economic law in general,
and international trade and investment law in particular.  There is still
room to pursue research into how international dispute systems have
dealt with issues of corruption (e.g., private international commercial
arbitration) or how to better adapt international arbitration, media-
tion, and negotiation to deal with corruption issues in the context of
trade and investment law.300
Corruption issues under investment disciplines are still very
much unexplored.  The work on a multilateral agreement on invest-
ment has slowed, and the study of this issue is yet to begin.  The po-
tential for corruption is higher—and with longer effects—in foreign
direct investment than in international commercial transactions.301
There are many questions that can be addressed in this area.  What is
trading system: 10. The system encourages good government (visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.
wto.org/wto/10ben/10ben10.htm>.
298. See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Or-
ganization, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 305 (1997).
299. In the last Ministerial Meeting at Seattle, Washington, a number of non-governmental
organizations mobilized to demand greater transparency and civil society participation in the
work and decisions of the WTO.  See L. Kim Tan, Anti-WTO Rallies Leave Mark - Participants
and Observers Look to Future, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 5, 1999, available in WESTLAW, All-
news Database.  In the regard, President Clinton proposed an ambitious agenda at the Geneva
Ministerial Meeting, including opening the dispute settlement system to public participation and
scrutiny.  See President Bill Clinton, Remarks at WTO Ministerial Meeting, supra note 296.
300. For example, the TI Integrity Pact includes the possibility of international arbitration to
resolve disputes arising out of violations of the anti-corruption agreement signed by government
and private parties in a procurement process.  Interesting questions arise regarding what would
be the applicable law and how to better deal with fact-finding rules.
301. A look into the corruption investigations that led to the FCPA in the United States re-
veal that the major cases of corruption—excepting defense contractors—were in the area of for-
eign direct investment.  See discussion supra Part II.A and II.B.
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the status of state responsibility for corruption of public officials?
How can the criminalization of foreign bribery influence international
investment law?  How is corruption related to the duty to provide fair
and equitable treatment?  Or even, how can corruption issues be
properly raised before international investment tribunals, and how
should international adjudicators deal with them?
b. Questions under International Criminal Law.  Possibly the
biggest question raised by the OECD Convention relates to
implementation and enforcement.  The effectiveness of the
Convention may rely on how signatories implement and then enforce
the foreign bribery provisions.302  Enforcement is ultimately
dependant on political will, but it can also be related to criminal
drafting technicalities, such as constitutional or legal constraints
arising from the way the crime is defined in the national legal system.
One can always ask whether the FCPA has curbed foreign cor-
rupt practices in the United States.  The record is not clear.  The U.S.
government has argued that compliance with the Act has cost Ameri-
can. businesses who have lost contracts to foreign competitors who
did not face similar constraints.  However, the studies on which these
allegations are based have not been made public.  In contrast, there
are indications that the FCPA has not been as successful as promoted,
or that it has been insufficiently enforced.  In the recently published
TI Bribe Payers Index, the United States scored 6.2 on a scale of 10,
with 10 being the lowest level of perceived propensity to pay bribes
abroad.303  This is a relatively poor result for the only country that has
criminalized foreign payments for the past twenty-five years.  The
small number of cases brought under the FCPA and the complete
lack of any criminal convictions resulting in prison sentences might
also cast doubts on the political will of the OECD Convention’s most
active promoter.304
But implementation and enforcement are not the only issues still
unresolved.  International criminal cooperation may play a key role in
the success of the OECD Convention.  Serious questions remain
about the current development of mutual legal assistance or even ex-
302. The OECD peer review process following the implementation and enforcement of the
Convention will play a relevant role.  As noted, Congress implemented its own report and re-
view mechanism.  TI is also following up the implementation of the OECD Convention by pub-
lishing comments on its web page about the legislation adopted by each country.
303. See Transparency International, supra note 275.
304. For a review of the cases brought under the FCPA see for example Rossbacher, supra
note 134, at 530.
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tradition.  Questions regarding the proceeds of bribery, the role of
off-shore financial facilities, the relationship with money-laundering,
payments to political parties, and payments to friends and family of
public officials are currently under review at the OECD.  Even the
simple question of how to promote the extension of the criminal anti-
bribery jurisdiction to other nations is highly contentious.  This Arti-
cle finally suggests that there should be further study into the use of
non-criminal legal tools to complement the work of public prosecu-
tors, including the possible use of a private right of action.
c. Questions under Human Rights Law.  The study of the
relationship between corruption and human rights is in its infancy.305
Scholars have begun to point out the possible effects of corruption on
human rights.306  Human rights issues can also play a role in
corruption allegations, where the purpose of the allegation is to
achieve an illicit political or economic purpose—for example, the
initiation or threat of corruption proceedings to oblige government
officials to act or refrain to act, or to stop them from pursuing anti-
corruption efforts.307
V.  CONCLUSION
After reviewing the development of international anti-corruption
efforts it is possible to classify these efforts under four general trends.
The strongest trend today is perhaps the move to criminalize bribery
of foreign officials and strengthen accounting practices, as headed by
the OECD countries.  Another trend is represented by the interna-
tional cooperative developments to strengthen the fight against do-
mestic corruption and bribery by government officials.  A third direc-
305. Transparency International has posted on its web a couple of working papers on this
topic.  See Nihal Jayawickrama, Corruption—A Violation of Human Rights? (June 1-2, 1998)
<www.transparency.de/documents/work-papers/jayawickrama.html>.
306. The question has been raised whether the effects of corruption can prejudice the full
realization of human rights, such as the right to work, to health, to a livelihood or to participate
in public life, if government officials corruptly take decisions against the public interest causing
jobs to be lost, public health to be poor, people to be evicted from their homes, or elections to
be fraudulent.  See id.  See also Laurence Cockroft, Corruption and Human Rights: A Crucial
Link (Oct. 19, 1998) <www.transparency.de/documents/work-papers/cockroft.html>.
307. Note, for example, the concern expressed by Transparency International regarding the
criminal process recently initiated against anti-corruption reformer Agustin Jarquin Anaya,
former General Comptroller of Nicaragua.  See Transparency International, Press Release:
Transparency International deeply concerned over arrest of Nicaraguan Comptroller-General
“Disturbing pattern of false accusations against officials who fight corruption in high places.”
(Nov. 12, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/press-releases/1999/1999.11.15.
nicaragua.html>.
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tion includes the movements to strengthen government procurement
processes and promote transparency.  A fourth one is the promotion
of comprehensive policy approaches, such as the development of
good governance principles and national integrity systems.  These
trends have all benefited from the active contribution of international
associations and non-governmental organizations.
The development of anti-corruption measures under interna-
tional law raises many questions and unresolved issues.  This analysis
has not discussed customary international law, related customary in-
ternational law, or potential customary international law in the field,
nor have we explained and tested the evolving anti-corruption regime
under different theoretical international law and relations frame-
works.  These and other issues await further study.
Recent international political conditionals have made it possible
to adopt international conventional obligations to fight corruption.
This emergence is significant.  These international obligations will
now be put to the test.  Will the OECD Convention be effectively im-
plemented?  Will it be effectively enforced?  Will its membership
grow?  Will the Inter-American Convention establish an effective
continental cooperation and extradition regime?  Will it be invoked?
These are all pending questions in the development of anti-corruption
initiatives under international law.
Finally, if conventional obligations are to strive for universality,
it may be necessary to pursue a more balanced conventional instru-
ment that uses the OECD Convention as starting point.  This new
agreement can draw on not only the achievements of the Inter-
American Convention, but also the developments and work con-
ducted by other international and non-governmental organizations
and by the study of the anti-corruption regime under international
law and other disciplines.  How to pursue this is just one of many in-
triguing questions yet to be answered in this evolving field.
